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THE ART OF LOGICK,

Gathered out of *Aristotle*, and set in due forme, according to his instructions, by *Peter Ramus*, Professor of *Philosophy* and *Rhetorick* in *Paris*, and there Martyred for the Gospell of the *Lord Iesus*.

With a short Exposition of the Præcepts, by which any one of indifferent *capacitie, may with a little paines*, attaine to some competent knowledge and vse of that noble *and necessary Science*.

Published for the Instruction of the vnlearned, *by* ANTONY WOTTON.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

TO THE
HONORABLE
L. IAMES,
Viſcount Doncaſter.

HONORABLE LORD;

IT is my deſire and purpoſe by this Treatiſe, to doe your moſt noble Grandfather the Lord *Denny*, ſome poore ſervice, by furthe-

ring your vertuous education. And whereby (except Religion) can that be more furthered, then by helping forward your *Lordſhips* perfection in the vſe of reaſon? It is that, which will enable you to judge of all Rules and Inſtructions in all matters, both great and ſmall: even in the managing of your horſe, in the vſe of your weapon, piece, and bow; yea, in the very comely cariage of your body. As for the knowledge of Arts, reading of Hiſtories, for Navigation, for Military affaires,

affaires, for matters of State, it is not possible for any man to know of what vse it is, but for him, that hath the vse of it. If it be thought too hard for your *Lordships* tender yeares, let it be layd by for a time. In the meane while, the acquainting of your selfe with the termes of the art, will both breed delight, and præparc you for the matter it selfe. But I haue many times observ'd in your *Lordship* diverse signes of more then ordinary capacitie; and therefore assure my selfe, that as *Virgill*

Ante annos, animumq; gerens, curamq; virilem. Æneid. lib. 9.

ſayd of *Aſcanius*, your diſcretion and carriage are aboue your yeares. With this perſwaſion I make bold to dedicate this *Logick* to your *Lordſhip*, and vpon this ground humbly entreat and exhort you, to goe forward in thoſe noble courſes, wherein you are, to ſatisfie or rather paſſe the hope of your honourable father & grand-father; remembring thoſe Verſes, of the old *Britiſh Poet, Ioſeph* of *Exceſter*:

Mento caneſcant alij, nos mente; capillo,
Nos animo: facie, nos pectore. Tempora certe
Virtutẽ non prima negant, non vltima donãt.

Let

Let others beards, our braines waxe gray and graue:
Their hairs, our harts: their looks, our minds be braue:
Both age may want: and youth may vertue haue.

The King of heaven encreaſe his graces in your *Lordſhip*, and ſanctifie all your noble parts, with the zeale of true Religion, and godlines, to your comfort here, and everlaſting happines hereafter in the Lord Ieſus Chriſt; to whoſe rich mercy I commend your good *Lordſhip*, and ſhall ever reſt

Deſirous to doe your Lord-
Tower-hill. ſhip *ſervice.*
May. 1.
1626.

ANTONY WOTTON.

¶ To the Reader.

IN ſtead of a Præface, which (if it had pleaſed the Lord to giue me health and eaſe) I was purpoſed to haue ſet before this Logicke, concerning the vſe thereof; I muſt now content my ſelfe, and entreat thee (Reader) to be content with a ſhort Aduertiſement of the occaſion and courſe of the buſineſſe.

Now the occaſion was, the neceſſity I conceiu'd of perſwading men (if it may be) to enter into a more ſerious conſideration of truth; eſpecially in matters of Religion. I ob-

obſerv'd, that true and ſound learning decayed daily; that froth of wit, and ſhew of reading, like a violent ſtreame, caryed all before them: that moſt men accounted of Logick, as Ahab did of Micah: Whom he could not abide, becauſe he would not ſooth him in his courſes, but tell him plainly and boldly, as the truth was. Logick will not ſuffer men to continue in errour, be it never ſo old and rooted, haue it never ſo many favourers and defenders. Therefore they, that loue the opinions, they haue long embraced, will not endure to ſee by Logick, that they haue bin miſtaken.

Yet I perſwaded my ſelfe, that it might be, ſome would be willing to præferre truth before cuſtome, and rather to beſtow paines in weighing & trying, then take that which was counterfeit vpon truſt with eaſe. This made me appoint my elder

der ſonne in Cambridge to tranſlate this Logick (whereof I had found ſo good vſe by more then fortie yeares experience) into Engliſh, for the benefit of them that vnderſtand not the Latin. He accordingly diſpatcht the buſineſſe, and withall added many examples, eſpecially out of the Scripture, with which he knew people were generally beſt acquainted. The expoſition was taken (for the moſt part) out of certaine notes, which I delivered him in Latin, before his going to the Vniverſitie.

They that will beſtow any indifferent paines, at ſpare houres, to read and compare the rules, examples, and expoſition together, ſhall find ſuch helpe for the diſcerning of truth from falſhood, as without tryall, they will not eaſily beleeue. If any thing ſeem not of vſe at the firſt, paſſe it over, & goe forward to that

which

which you may easily know how to make vse of at the first sight. I confesse, the former part touching arguments, is lesse delightfull and easie: yet of such necessitie to soundnesse of iudgement, that without it our guesse will be very vncertaine.

For all our knowledge ordinarily (except that, which we haue bred in vs by nature, or receiue by præsent sense) ariseth out of severall Propositions: Whereof how shall we be able to iudge, if we vnderstand not what respects things haue each to other? For example Man is a living creature, endued with reason. In this propositiõ, or sentence, I first enquire; whether it be true or no: second'y, what knowledge I attaine to thereby. Now for the former, how shall I know, whether this be true or no, that is, whether reason be truly attributed to man, or no; if I be ignorant, what arguments

man

man *and* reaſon *are; that is, what reſpect theſe haue each to other? When I haue learned, that* reaſon *is the forme, and* man *the thing formed, I vnderſtand withall, that I know the very nature of man.*

Againe; When I heare that Man *is a* ſinner, *& haue found that* man *and* ſinne, *are* ſubject *&* adjunct, *I vnderſtand, that* ſin *is truely affirmed of* man, *and that the knowledge I haue of him thereby, is but onely of that, which is added to him beſides his nature: and that therefore this knowledge is vnperfect, and vnable to giue me true intelligence what man is.*

But ſome man perhaps will ſay: Can you know by Logick, *that* reaſon *is the forme,* ſinne *an* adjunct *of* man? *Not immediately, but as it were at the ſecond hand. I muſt enquire of naturall Philoſophy, how* reaſon *belongs to* man. *By that I*

am

am taught, that Reaſon *is that, by which* man *is* man, *and differeth from all other things whatſoever. This being found, I looke into* Logick *to ſee what agreement they haue together. There I am given to vnderſtand, that the one (as I ſignified before) is the forme, the other the thing formed; and that therefore, they agree abſolutely as cauſe and effect, and giue me the true knowledge of the nature of man.*

That man *is a* ſinner, *I am informed by Diuinitie; and ſince* reaſon *and* ſinne *are not all one, I conclude, that this is not the forme of* man: *yea more, by applying the definition a cauſe to it, I perceiue it is no cauſe of him at all; becauſe he hath no part of his being by force of it: Therefore ſince it agrees to* man, *it muſt happen to him as an adiunct. It is then truly ſayd of* man, *but*

but in a lower degree, then reaſon *is, and ſo breeds more vnperfect knowledge of him.*

This I thought needfull to be ſet out by way of example, as ſhortly as well I could, that the vſe of Inven-tion *(which in moſt* Logicks *is either omitted, or ſlightly handled) might appeare to be worth our labour and induſtry.*

Here I will reſt my ſelfe for this time, and commending the ſucceſſe of this matter to the good bleſſing of God, ever reſt

Thine in all good offices
of this kind,

Tower-hill,
May 2.
1626.

ANTONY WOTTON.

THE ART OF LOGICK, written by *Peter Ramus.*

Chapter I.

What Logick is?

[a] *Logick is an* [b] *Art of* [c] *reasoning* [d] *well.* [a.] *It is also called Dialectick;*

Præcept. 1.

OGICK] Λόγος in Greeke signifieth reason; λογικός belonging to; or concerning reason: so that Logick is employed

Expos.

on reason. [b] *An Art*] By Art, I meane

meane, a frame as it were of præcepts or rules orderly ſet down, for inſtruction, in ſomething profitable or vſefull for mankind. [c] *Reaſoning*] Vſing reaſon, that is conſidering, debating, diſcourſing, diſputing, either with our ſelues, or with other: by ſpeaking, writing, meditating of any matter whatſoeuer. [d] *Well*] According as the true vſe of reaſon requires, we ſhould doe; whereas through ignorance wee many times miſtake, and reaſon otherwiſe then we ſhould. So then the ſumme of this is that, Logick is an orderly frame of rules, whereby we are taught, how to vſe reaſon (for the manner of reaſoning) as indeed it ought to be vſed. [e] *Dialectick*] Logick and Dialectick, are two names of the ſame thing. Logick is more common in Engliſh. Dialectick cõmeth from διαλέγεσθαι to reaſon.

Chap. II.

Of the parts of Logick, and of the diuers kinds of arguments.

There are [a] *two* [b] *parts of Logick* { *Inuention,* / *Iudgement.* — Præcept. 1.

[a] *Two*] Logick is the true picture of our naturall facultie in reasoning: wherein we doe no more, but either consider, what respect each seuerall thing hath to other, or joyne them together according to that respect; that wee may discerne betwixt truth and falshood. So that the parts of Logick are two, and no more. [b] *Parts*] These parts are as it were the members, whereof logick doth consist, as a man doth of a soule and a body.

[a] *Inuention is a* [b] *part of Logick; touching the finding out of arguments.* — Præ. 2.

[a] *Inuention*] To invent, of the Latine — Exposit.

tine *inuenire* to find, is (ordinarily) to deuize, or find out by ſearching, and ſtudying. But this name is too skantie, and ſeemes only to conſeerne thoſe arguments which we call *third arguments, or middle termes*, See *lib. 2 cap. 9.* [b] *Part of Logick*] Inuention and Iudgements agree in this generall, that they are both parts of Logick, as the ſoule, and the body are both parts of a man. [c] *Finding out*] This finding out muſt not be conceiued to be the deuiſing of arguments to proue; but a declaring of the nature of ſeuerall arguments: Logick teacheth vs to find out arguments after a generall manner, by ſhewing vs the places, or heades whence we are to fetch the proofe, or declaration of a thing: and therefore this part of Logick, is called in Greeke by the Stoiks τοπικὴ, of τόπος a place.

There is no knowledge to be had of any thing, but by ſome argument of Logick. For whatſoeuer can proue or declare a thing, is either a cauſe, an effect, a ſubiect, or an adjunct; &

ſo

ſo of the reſt. Now Logick teacheth what a cauſe, an effect, a ſubject, an adjunct is; what things are divers, what contrary; what things in compariſon are equall, what vnequall, what greater, what leſſe, &c. And this it doth, onely by delivering generall rules.

An argument is [a] *that, which hath a* [b] *fitneſſe to* [c] *argue* [d] *ſomething.* Præ. 3.

[a] *That*] That what? will ſome man ſay. If you will, that thing. For I take that word thing in Engliſh to be as large; as τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν, *ens & non ens*, in Greeke an Latine. [b] *A fitneſſe*] That is, which in its nature, doth declare, or make knowne. [c] *Argue*] Proue, declare, make knowne, ſet out; For ſome arguments, as ſimilitudes, haue no force to proue, but onely to declare, and ſet out a thing. [d] *Something*] Several argumẽts proue or declare ſeverall things; every argument ſomething or other; what this, or that argueth, is to be learned Expoſit.

in the particulars.

Præ 4. *Such are the* [a] *ſeverall* [b] *reſpects of things conſidered* [c] *alone and* [d] *by themſelues.*

Expoſit. [a] *Severall*] Not onely the middle termes, or third arguments, but every ſeverall reſpect, is an argument. [b] *Reſpects*] By reſpect I meane reference, or relation, that one hath to another As man referred to God, is an effect or creature; in relation to the place he dwelleth in, an adjunct: in reſpect of the worke hee doth, a cauſe of wealth, poverty; ſickneſs, health a ſubiect. [c] *Alone*] Not coupled, or bound together in any propoſition. [d] *By themſelues*] It ſeemeth, this latter is put in to expound the former word Alone. Now that there may be ſuch a conſideration of arguments in Logick, it may appeare by the like in Grammar; where interpretation declareth the nature of nownes, verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions ſeverally: of which there is no vſe in ſpeech, but as they are joyned together

cogether in Syntaxe, or Construction.

An argument is { *Artificiall,* / *naturificiall.* — Præc. 5.

An [a] *artificiall argument, is that which argueth of it* [b] *selfe.* — 6.

[a] *Artificiall*] The termes are from *Aristotle* and *Quintilian*, but the signification is divers. [b] *Of it selfe*] By its owne nature: that hath in it selfe force to proue or declare. — Exposit.

And it is Primitiue, or Derivatiue. — Præc. 7.

These termes are already in vse, and knowne to Grammar Scholars. — Exposit.

[a] *Primitiue, which is of it* [b] *selfe.* — Præc. 8.

[a] *Primitiue*] Of the Latine word *Primus*: First, Primitiue arguments are first, both in nature, and order. — Exposit.

[b] *Of it selfe*] which hath force to argue, not onely in it selfe, as all artificiall arguments haue, but also of it selfe; not of any other, whence it commeth.

And it is { *Positiue,* / *Comparatiue.* — Præc. 9.

These are also Grammar words, and therefore reteyned.

Præc. 10. [a] *Positiue, which is* [b] *simply and* [c] *absolutely considered.*

Exposit. [a] *Positiue*] Put or set; of the Latine *ponere*. Because the positiue word, onely setteth downe, or delivereth the thing, without any adding of quantity: as *Good*, *Iust*, declare the quality of goodnesse, or justice; but *Better*, *Iuster* the comparatiue thereof, besides the quality of goodnes or justice, consider also the quantity, in comparison of some other, that is lesse good, or lesse just. [b] *Simply*] Barely, without any addition whatsoever; as in the former example. [c] *Absolutely*] From the Latine word *Absolvere* to free, as it were freed from all other considerations; the word seemes to be added for the expounding of the former.

Præc. 11. *And it* [a] *is Consentany or Dissentany.*

Exposit. [a] Every artificiall primitiue positiue

tiue argument is Consentany, or Dissentany.

A [a] *Consentany argument is that, which agreeth with the thing it* [b] *argueth.* Præ. 12.

[a] *Consentany*] Consenting, of the Latine word *Consentire*, to agree in the same sense, feeling, vnderstanding; generally to agree in whatsoever. [b] *It argueth*] Consentany arguments declare a thing by agreeing with it, some way or other. Expos.

And it is Consentany absolutely, or after a sort. Præc. 13.

There is full agreement betwixt some things, not so full betwixt other some; these agree absolutely, these after a sort. Expos.

Absolutely; as the cause, and the effect. Præc. 14.

The cause and the effect agree without all exception, as you would say; not in some part respect onely; so that the one makes the other knowne Expos.

known as fully as may be; in a word absolutely; of *Absolvere* to make perfect.

Chap. III.

Of the efficient cause, as it is procreant, or conservant.

Præc. 1. *The* [a] *cause is* [b] *that, by* [c] *force whereof the* [d] *thing* [e] *is*

Expos. [a] The *cause*] A cause, if wee say *The cause*, our meaning is, The argument called a cause, is that &c. [b] *That*] Giue me leaue once for all to signifie that whatsoever hath hitherto beene sayd of an artificiall argument, all that belongeth to a cause: namely, *A cause is an argument*, which hath fitnes to argue, both in it selfe, as being artificiall, & of it selfe, as being Primitiue; and that positiuely, without being compared to any other; yea by way of agreement

agreement with that, it argueth; and ſuch agreement, as is abſolute and perfect, not after a ſort or by halues. [c] *By force*]_That hath ſome hand in making the thing to be, whereof it is a cauſe. [d] *The thing*] The thing it argueth, proueth, or declareth. [e] *Is*] This word *Is*, doth not onely ſignifie the preſent being, but alſo belongeth to all times paſt, preſent, and to come; ſo that whatſoeuer already hath beene, is now in doing or making, ſhall hereafter be done or made, that is, was, ſhall be by vertue of the cauſe thereof.

[a] *Therefore this firſt* [b] *place of Inuention, is the* [c] *fountaine of all knowledge.* Præc. 2.

[a] *Therefore*] Becauſe true knowledge is nothing elſe, but the underſtanding how, and by force of what, things come to be, or haue being. Expoſit. [b] *Firſt place.*] This head, or ſeat of arguments, which is the firſt in this part of *Logicke*, called *Inuention*, is the fountaine of all knowledge. [c] *Fountaine*]

taine] Spring, whence knowledge doth flow; for nothing is knowne, as long as the cause is unknowne.

Præc. 3. *And that is* [a] *thought to be knowne, the* [b] *cause whereof we understand.* That the *Poet* had good reason to say. *Happie count we the man, that knowes all things by the causes.*

Exposit. [a] *That is thought*] *Ramus* confirmes that he said by the testimony of *Aristotle* and *Ovid.* [b] *The cause*] Then onely may we be truely said to know a thing, when we understand what the causes be, by force wherof it hath being, or is.

Præc. 4. *The cause is* 1. *Efficient, or matter.* 2. *forme or end.*

Exposit. Here are two kindes of causes; but their nature is not so well knowne, that we can giue them any names.

Præc. 5. *The* [a] *efficient is* [b] *that,* [c] *from which the* [d] *thing* [e] *is.*

Exposit. [a] *Efficient.*] *Efficere* in Latine is to make, cause, bring to passe, effect, doe: from thence this first kinde of cause

cause is called *efficient working*, because all working and moving to the causing of a thing to be, is from the efficient, or him that worketh. [b] *That*] The efficient is that cause, &c. [c] *From which*] The word *From* is as proper in our tongue, to the efficient, as either the Greeke ὑπὸ, or the Latine *A*. This came from God, that is, God was the Author of this. [d] *The thing*] To which it hath reference, or which it argueth. [e] *Is*] From the working, or moving whereof it hath being. The efficient cause then, is that kind of cause, which argueth the thing, as the Author of it.

[a] *Whereof though we* [b] *cannot find out true* [c] *kindes: yet may we observe* [d] *great varietie, according to the diverse* [e] *manner of working.* Præc. 6.

[a] *Whereof*] Of the efficient cause. Expos.
[b] *We cannot*] *Ramus* doth not say that there are no true kindes of the efficient cause, but that we cannot find any. [c] *Kindes*] Of living creatures we find

find out the true kindes, or sort that some are indued with reason some are without reason; but we cannot doe the like in the efficient cause.

[d] *Great varietie*] All efficient causes are not alike; but we may find some meanes of distinguishing, or making difference betwixt them.

[e] *Manner of working*] The difference we obserue, is in the divers manner of working. Though all efficient causes make the thing as the Authors say it, yet there is some diversitie in their working.

Præc 7. *First the efficient cause* [a] *Begetteth or* [b] *maintaineth.*

Exposit. [a] *Begetteth.*] Causeth or maketh to be; one kind of making to be, is put for all kindes whatsoeuer. [b] *Maintaineth*] Maketh that which is, to continue in being, and to grow. One manner then of working is, that the efficient worketh, by making things to be, or preserving them in being.

Example. *In the beginning God created heauen and earth.* Gen. 1. 1.

King

Kings shall be thy nursing fathers and Queenes thy nursing mothers. Esa. 49. 23.

So King *Henry* the 6. was the founder of the two Kings Colledges in *Cambridge* and *Eaton*; and all the Kings and Queenes of *England* since, haue beene preseruers, gardians, and maintainers of them.

No common wombe was fit me forth to bring,
But a faire virgin Priest child to a King;
No mortall father worthy was to breede me;
No humane milke was feirce enough to feed me.
Therefore the God of warre by wonder bred me,
And a shee Wolfe by noblesse wonder fed me.
Davilon. devis. 2. of Romulus.

So when thou seem'st fit for the cure of Art;
Let idlenesse be wholly set a part.
This makes thee loue; this nurseth sweete desire;
This is the food and fewell of that fire.
Shun idlenesse, and broke lies Cupids bow, (*show.*
His brands quencht out, nor heate, nor light doe
Ovid. de Remed. Amor. lib. 1.

In the first example; God was the effici- | Exposit.

efficient cauſe of the world, by cauſing it to be; whereas before it was not. Kings and Queenes are the efficient cauſes of the Church; by preſeruing and cauſing it to flouriſh.

King *Henry* the 6. was the efficient cauſe of the two Kings Colledges, by making them to be; other Kings and Queenes ſince, by maintaining them in being.

Mars and *Ilia*, the father and mother of *Romulus* were efficient cauſes of him by procreation; the ſhe-wolfe by nurſing. Idleneſſe is both the breeder, and nurſe of wanton luſt.

Chap. IIII.

Of the ſole and joynt efficient cauſes.

Prec. 1. *Secondly, the efficient worketh, either alone, or with other.*

Expoſit. THIS is a ſecond manner of working, when the efficient worketh either alone, or with company.

I haue

I haue troden the wine-preſſe alone; and of the people there was none with me. Iſay. 63. 3. *And I looked and there was none to helpe; and I wondered, that there was none to uphold; therefore mine owne arme brought ſalvation vnto me, and my fury, it vpheld me.* verſ. 5. Examp.

This is applied by the fathers to our Saviour Chriſt, who wrought the Redemption of man-kind alone. 1

So *David* layeth the whole fault vpon himſelfe alone, and cleareth the people. *Loe I haue ſinned, and I haue done wickedly; but theſe ſheepe, what haue they done?* 2 Sam. 24. 17. 2

David alone ſinned; not the people. 2

The band, and the Captaine, and the officers of the Iewes tooke Ieſus, and bound him. Ioh. 18. 12. 3

All theſe together tooke Ieſus.

Of the cauſes that worke together, oftentimes one is the principall efficient, and the reſt are acceſſary as helpers, or ſervants. Præc. 2.

Iudas was guide to them that tooke Examp. 1.

Iesus. Act. 1. 16. *Iudas* was the principall, the reſt, aſſiſtants or helpers. So the *Maiſter-workman*; ſo the *Generall* in an Army. Therefore *Ioab* ſent to *David to gather the reſt of the people together, and to come to take Rabbah, that it might be called after his name. And David gathered all the people together, and fought againſt it, and tooke it.* 2 Sam. 12. 28. 29. *David* was the *principall efficient*, the Souldiers *helpers*.

Præc. 3. *Inſtruments alſo and tooles are reckoned amongſt the helping cauſes.*

1 *Examp.* *Of his owne will begot he vs with the word of truth.* Iames. 1. 18. The principall efficient is God; the inſtrument the Word.

2 *David preuailed over the Philiſtim with a ſling and a ſtone.* 1 Sam. 17. 50. The principall *David*; the inſtruments a ſling and a ſtone.

By this argument the woman of *Samaria* concludeth, that our *Saviour* could not giue her the water of life.

life. *Thou haſt nothing to draw with, and the Well is deepe; from whence then haſt thou this water of life.* Ioh. 4. 11. She thought the Lord Ieſus could not come by the water, for want of an hooke or cord.

CHAP. V.

Of the efficient by it ſelfe, and by accident.

Thirdly, the efficient cauſe worketh of it ſelfe, or by accident. Præcept. 1.

THis is the third manner of working, when the efficient worketh of it ſelfe, or by accident. Expoſit.

That cauſe worketh [a] *of it ſelfe, which worketh by* [b] *its own power.* Præ. 2.

[a] *Of it ſelfe*] Not as a dead Inſtrument, which hath no power to moue it ſelfe to, or in working. [b] *Own power*] Abilitie or facultie, which it hath in it ſelfe. Expoſit.

Præc. 3. *Such are those, which worke by* [a] *nature, or vpon deliberation.*

Exposit. [a] *Nature*] A faculty naturall to them, or arising from their nature.

Examp. 1. So the winds blow. *There came a great winde from the Wildernesse, and smote the foure corners of the house that it fell.* Iob. 1. 19.

2 *The raine descended and the flouds came, and the winds blew, and beat vpon the house and it fell.* Mat. 7. 27.

An example of working vpon deliberation, is the persecution of *Paul*. *I verily thought, that I ought to doe many things against the name of Iesus: which thing also I did at Ierusalem, and many of the Saints I shut vp in prison.* Act. 26. 9. 10.

So *Balam* justifieth his beating of his Asse. *Num.* 22. 29. And *Ionah* his anger for the Gourd. *Ion.* 4. 9.

Præc. 4. *The cause worketh by* [a] *accident, when it worketh by some* [b] *outward power.*

Exposit. [a] *Accident*] Chance, not by any naturall facultie, or vpon deliberation.

on. *Outward*] Some power, that is not within the ordering of the worker.

Of this kind are those actions, which are done of necessitie, or by hap. Of necessitie; when the efficient is, as it were, forced to that, he doth. Præc. 5.

Without thy minde would I doe nothing, that it should not be as it were of necessitie, but willingly. Philem. vers. 14. *Examp.* 1.

If *Paul* had kept *Onesimus*, without *Philemons* liking, he should haue seemed to pardō him whether he would or nō. Expost.

So it seemes to be in the case of sin. *I see another Law in my members, warring against the Law of my minde, and bringing me into captivitie, to the Law of sinne.* Rom. 7. 23. 2

Such is the violence of our corruption, as if we were forced by it to sin. To this belongeth the Decree of God; which implyes a necessitie of the event, though men doe, that they

doe, wittingly and willingly.

3 *Notwithstanding they hearkned not to the voyce of their father, because the Lord would slay them.* 1 Sam. 2. 25.

They sinned willingly; but it could not (in the event) fall out otherwise, because the Lord had resolved to slay them.

4 *Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into his glory?* Luke. 24 26.

There was a necessitie, it could not be otherwise, but he must suffer.

5 *Not my will, but Fate did fetch*
Mee poore wretch,
Into this unhappie errour.
Davit. pasto. 5.

The Shepheard would lay the fault of his inconstancy vpon *destiny.*

Præc. 6. *Fortune is a cause by accident, when something happeneth besides the intent of the efficient.*

1 Examp. *When a man goeth into the field with his neighbour to hew wood, & his hatchet*
fetche

fetcheth a ſtroke with the Axe, to cut downe the tree, and the head ſlippeth from the helue, and lighteth vpon his neighbour that he dye, he ſhall flee to one of thoſe Cities and liue. Deut. 19. 5.

It was beſides his meaning to kill his neighbour.

So reaſoned *David* when *Shimei* curſed him, *It may be that the Lord will looke vpon mine affliction, and that he will requite good, for his curſing this day.* 2 Sam. 16. 12. *Shimeis* curſing may by accident proue a bleſſing vpon *David*. For *Shimei* intended not, that God ſhould bleſſe *David*. 2

Hitherto ignorance, and vnadviſedneſſe are to be referred. Præc. 7.

And now brethren I wot, that through ignorance you did it; as did alſo your Rulers. Act. 3. 17. Ignorance is made the cauſe of their ſinne. Examp. 1.

But I obtained mercy; becauſe I did it ignorantly. 1 Tim 1 13. Ignorance is put for the cauſe of *Pauls* obteining pardon. 2

To this place alſo belongeth that 3

of *David*; *Remember not the sinnes of my youth.* Psal. 25. 7.

Ignorance and vnadvisednesse, are the causes that young men sinne.

4 And that of the same King: *Lord take away the iniquitie of thy servant; for I haue done very foolishly.* 2 Sam. 24 10. *David* did vnaduisedly in numbring the people.

Præc. 8. *Indeed the name of Fortune arose from the ignorance of the true causes of things. For when any thing falls out otherwise then wee looke for, it is commonly called Fortune.* So that *Iuvenall* sayd very fitly.

Fortune hath Godhead none, where wisdome swayes,
Wee fooles her Godhead to the skies doe raise.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Matter.

Præcept. 1. *The matter is the* [a] *cause,* [b] *of which the* [c] *thing is.*

[a] THE *cause*] It is a cause, for that the thing or effect is by force of

of it. [b] *Of which*] The præpoſition (*of*) ſignifieth particularly, how the effect is by force of the matter: namely, as by that, wherof it is made; as an houſe is built of timber, ſtones, bricke, morter, and the like. [c] *The thing*] the effect, which is made of the matter.

Examp. 1. *The building of the wall thereof was Iaſper, and the Cittie was pure gold, like vnto cleare glaſſe. And the foundations of the wall of the Cittie were garniſhed with all manner of precious ſtones, &c. Revel.* 21. 18, 19. 20. 21. The matter of the wall and Cittie was Iaſper, gold, all manner of precious ſtones.

2 So the matter of the Tabernacle is deſcribed, *Gold, ſilver, and braſſe, and blew ſilke and purple, and ſcarlet, and fine linnen, and goats haire, and rams ſkins dyed red, and badgers ſkins, and Shittim wood.* Exod. 35. 6. 7. 8. The matter of the Tabernacle, Gold, ſilver, braſſe, &c.

3 King *Salomon* made himſelfe a Chariot of the wood of *Lebanon*, *He made the pillars thereof of ſilver, & the pauement thereof of gold, the hangings there-*

of

of of purple. Song of *Salomon*, chap. 3. vers. 9. 10. The wood of *Lebanon*, *silver*, *gold*, were the matter of *Salomons* Chariot.

Chap. VII.
Of the forme.

Prec. 1. [a] *Such is the first* [b] *kind of causes, conteining the efficient, and the matter; the* [c] *second followeth, consisting of the forme, and the end.*

Exposit. [a] *Such*] As we haue declared, and set out by examples. [b] *Kind.*] The causes are diuided into two kinds; whereof the former hath two branches, the *efficient*, the *matter*. [c] *Second*] The second kind hath two also, the *forme*, and the *end*: and these two are the second in order, because the *efficient* and *matter* commonly goe before; the *forme*, and the *end* follow accompanying the effect.

Prec. 2. *The forme is the* [a] *cause*, [b] *by which the*

the thing is that, [c] which it is.

[a] *Cause*] Therefore the thing is by force of the forme. [b] *By which*] The præposition by shewing what kinde of force the *forme* hath in causing the effect. [c] *That which it is*] The thing is sayd to be by its essence and existence; but to be that, which it is, by the forme. A table, if we consider the wood and matter of it, is no more a table, then a cupbord, a stoole, a beame, a post, or any other such thing made of wood; but by the forme it hath, it is a table. Expos.

And [a] therefore by it, [b] one thing is [c] distinguished from another. Præc. 3.

[a] *Therefore*] Because the forme makes the thing to be that, which it is, therfore it sheweth, wherein things truely, and essentiall differ, each from other. Expos. [b] *By it*] There are other difference; but the maine is by the forme. [c] *Distinguished*] Made or declared to differ; from *distinguere* in Latine, to sever, part, or divide a sunder.

And

Prz. 4. *And the forme is [a]bred [b]in the thing, [c]together with the thing it selfe.*

Exposit. [a] *Bred.*] That is, it hath its being, or is made to be. [b] *In the thing*] As that, which is so inward to the thing, that by it the thing is that, it is. [c] *Together*] So that, the one beginneth, as I may say, groweth, and is finished with the other; as soone as the wood hath the forme of a table, there is a table; and as soone as there is a table, the wood hath the forme of a table.

Examp. *The reasonable soule is the forme of man; because by it man is man, and is distinguished from all other natures. So Geometricall figures have their formes; some being triangles, some quadrangles, some circles. So naturall things, as heaven, earth, trees, fishes, fowles, have their severall formes.*

Prze. 5. *Therfore when we declare any thing, we must declare it, according to the nature, or forme of it, if we can attaine to the knowledge thereof; as in artificiall things we may more easily do.*

He

He made also the house of the forrest of Lebanon an hundred cubits long, and fiftie cubits broad, and thirtie cubits high, &c. 1 Kings. 7. 2. 3 4 5. 6. The forme of the house is declared by the length, bredth, height, pillars, beames, three rankes of windowes, dores and posts square. Examp. 1.

Thou shalt make a Candlestieke of pure gold, of worke beaten out with the hammer shall the Candlesticke be made; his shaft, his branches, his boules, his knops, & his flowers shall be of the same, &c. Exod. 25. 31. 32. 33. &c. The forme of the Candlesticke is set out by the seaven branches, knops, &c. 2

So forgivenesse of sinnes is made the forme of justification; As *David* declareth the blessednesse of a man unto whom God imputeth righteousnesse without workes, &c. Rom. 4. 6. 7. 8.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.
Of the end.

Præc. 1. *The [a] end is the [b] cauſe, [c] for which the thing is.*

Expoſit. [a] *The end*] By end is not meant the vttermoſt terme, or being of a thing, as when we ſay the end of life; but the chiefe good, and as it were vſe, for which the thing is, and ſerveth; as all creatures are for mans vſe. The end is the laſt of the cauſes; and is called the perfection of the thing; not as the forme, which makes the thing to be that it is, but as a fruit of the forme, ariſing from the thing now conſtituted or made. It is ſaid to be the firſt in the intent of the efficient, becauſe, in his diſcourſe or purpoſe, it goes before the matter and the forme. For a man conſidereth, what the thing ſhall ſerue for, before he prepare matter to make it of, and deviſe the forme of it. The end of the motion or worke, whereby the thing is made, is the forme of the thing; or the effect; as the end

of

of building is the form of the house, or the house it selfe: but the end of the house it selfe, or thing made by that motion, or worke, is fitnesse for dwelling. There may also be a farther end of the workeman; as desire to shew his skill; or to get profit by the thing. [b] *Cause*] Therefore the end hath some stroke in causing the thing to be. [c] *For which*] what stroke the end hath is noted by the particle *For*.

Examp.

Man is the end of naturall things, and God the end of man. For the creatures are for mans vse, and man for Gods service.

All arts haue some chiefe good, and maine end; as the end of Grammar is to speake well: of Rhetoricke to plead well: of Logick to reason well. The end of the Sunne, Moone, and Starres was to giue light to the earth, and to distinguish the times, by daies, moneths yeares, *Gen.* 1. 14. *So God loued the world, that he gaue his onely begotten Sonne, that whosoeuer beleeueth in him, should not perish, but haue everlasting life. For God sent not his Sonne into the world*

world to condemne the world, but that the world through him might be ſaved. Ioh. 3. 16. 17. The end, why God ſent his Son, was to ſaue the world.

Him, that knew not ſinne, God made ſinne for vs, that wee might be the righteouſneſſe of God in him. 2 Cor. 5. 21. The end of our Saviour Chriſts Sacrifice, was our acquittall.

So the ends of *Marriage* are declared in the Booke of Common prayer; firſt, *the procreation of children*; ſecondly, *a remedie againſt ſinne*; thirdly, *the mutuall ſocietie, helpe, and comfort, that the one ought to haue of the other.*

CHAP. IX.

Of the effect.

Præc. 1. *The [a] effect is that, which [b] commeth of the cauſes.*

Expoſit. [a] EFfect] From *efficere* to make, *effectum*, that which is made, or cauſed. It is generally taken for that, which

which proceedeth from, or hath being; by all the causes joyntly considered. [b] *Commeth*] Ariseth of the causes, is made to be by the causes. Which is or hath being; From the efficient; Of the matter; By the forme; For the end. As man is from God, of the earth, by the reasonable soule, for the service of God.

Therefore whether a thing be [a] *made, or destroyed, or* [b] *after any sort moved; this* [c] *motion, and the* [d] *thing caused by this motion is called the effect.* Præc. 21

[a] *Made or destroyed*] Caused to be, or not to be; as when an house is built or pulled downe; both the building, and the pulling downe are effects. [b] *After any sort*] Howsoever altered or stirred; as if a garment be changed in fashion, if a tree be shaken by the wind. [c] *Motion*] Act of moving; as building, pulling downe, altering, stirring, by any meanes whatsoever. [d] *The thing caused*] As the act, so the thing done by that act: Exposit.

the house that is built; the garment that is altered, is an effect.

The cause is said absolutely to agree with the effect, because there is betwixt them a cōmunion of essence, for the cause giveth essence or being to the effect.

The cause and the effect argue each other diversly: the cause argueth or declareth the effect, by shewing how and why it is; διότι, the effect argueth the causes, by shewing only that they are ὅτι.

Præc. 3. *From this* [a] *place of the effect, wee gather* [b] *prayses and* [c] *disprayses, whereof both holy and profane bookes are full.*

Exposit. [a] *Place*] From this head or place of *Logick* which we call the effect.

[b] *Prayses*] The bookes of the Kings are full of examples: *Asa did that, which was right in the eyes of the Lord, as did David his father, and he tooke away the Sodomites out of the land, and removed all the Idols, that his father had made, &c.* 1 Kings 15. 11. 12. 13.

So

So *Iehoſaphat*. 1 Kings. 18, 3. 4. So *Ioſiah*. 2 Kings. 22. 2.

c *Diſprayſes*] Such is that of *Baaſha*. *And he did evill in the ſight of the Lord, and walked in the way of Ieroboam, and in his ſinne, wherewith he made Iſrael ſinne*. 1 Kings. 15. 34. So *Ahab*. 1 Kings. 17. 30. 31. 32. &c. So *Iehu*. 2 Kings 10. 31. So *Manaſſeh*. 2 King. 21. 2. 3. 4. Doing that which was right, that which was evill, &c. are the effects of the good and bad Kings.

Hither are the ſayings and writings of men to be referred. Præc. 4.

The ſayings and writings of men are effects. Expoſit.

By this argument Demoſthenes and Tully are commended for Oratory; Homer and Virgill for Poëtry. Præc 5.

Eloquent Orations were the effects of *Demoſthenes*, and *Tully*; excellent Poëms of *Homer*, and *Virgill*. Expoſit.

To this place we referre the conſultations and deliberations of men, Præc 6.

though they were never put in execution.

Examp. *Parry and Lopez were traytors for purposing to kill Queene Elizabeth, though they never came so much as to attempt it. So Winter, Digby, Rookwood, Faux, and the rest were justly put to death for conspiring and attempting that horrible and monstrous gun-powder treason.* Their conspiracy was an effect.

Prop. 7. *Vertues also and vices have their effects.*

Expos. The true, proper, and formall effects of vices and vertues, are the fitting and enabling those, in whom they are, to vertuous and vicious actions, according to their severall natures: the vertuous and vicious actions are the effects of men so qualified. The effect of drunkennesse is set forth; *To whom is woe? to whom is rednesse of the eyes, &c.* Proverbs 23, 29, 30. &c. So Chap. 31. vers. 4. 5.

CHAP.

Chap. X.

Of the Subject.

Now follow the arguments, which are [a] consentany after a sorte; [b] such are the Subiect and Adiunct. Præcept. 1.

[a] *Consentany*] Which agree with each other; yet not absolutely, as the cause and the effect; but in some respect onely, so that there is here no communicating of essence. Expos.

[b] *Such are*] These consentany arguments are the Subject, and Adjunct.

The [a] Subiect is [b] that, to which [c] something is adioyned. Præ. 2.

[a] *Subiect*] *Subijcere* to cast or lay vnder; Subject, that which is cast or laid vnder; vpon which something as it were resteth, or stayeth. Expos.

[b] *That*] That consentany argument, which hath respect to a thing, as that, on which the thing rests, or to which it belongs.

[c] *Something*] Which belongs not to the causing of it to be; that is, which is the part of the essence any way, but is added besides the essence or being.

Præc. ing. *The ſoule is the ſubiect of knowledg,*
Examp. *ignorance, vertue, vice; becauſe they be-*
long to the ſoule; yet as no part of the
eſſence or being thereof. So the body is
the ſubiect of health, ſickneſſe, ſtrength,
weakneſſe, beautie, deformitie: and theſe
adiuncts are called inharent, or abiding
Expoſit. *in the ſubiect. Man is the ſubiect of*
riches, povertie, honour, diſgrace, of his
Expoſit. *apparell and company: theſe adjuncts*
are called externall, or outward.
Examp. *The place is the ſubiect of things placed in it: So the Philoſophers attribute*
place to the divine ſubſtances: though
indeed they haue neither parts, nor quan-
titie, or greatneſſe. So the Geometricians conſider place, and the differences
thereof, in their Geometricall figures.
So naturall Philoſophers much more di-
ligently in naturall things, in the world,
in the ſimple elements, and compound
bodies. So ſeverall places are alotted
to ſeverall creatures.

In heaven the bleſſed Angels haue their being;
In hell the fiends appointed to damnation.
To men and beaſts earth yeelds firme habitation;
The wing'd Muſicians in the ayre are fleeing.

With

With finnes the people gliding,
Of water haue the emoying:
In fire (all els deſtroying)
The Salamander finds a ſtrange abi-
Davil: Od. 9. *(ding.*

After this manner ſenſible things are ſaid to be the ſubiects of the ſenſes; and thoſe things, about which vertues and vices are exerciſed, are the ſubiects of vertues and vices.

Colour is the ſubiect of ſight; ſound of hearing; becauſe thoſe ſenſes are employed in theſe ſenſible things. Vertues and vices are declared in Ethicks, or books of Morall Philoſophie, by this argument: as, temperancy and intemperancy by pleaſure; courage and cowardlineſſe by danger; liberalitie and couetouſneſſe by riches. This is commonly called the obiect. So things that be numbred are the ſubiect of Arithmetick; things that can be meaſured of Geometry. By this kind of argument doth our Lord ſtill the ſtrife amongſt his Diſciples, when they ſtroue which of them ſhould be the greateſt. *The Kings of the Gentiles exerciſe lordſhip ouer them,*

and they that exercise authoritie upon them, are called benefactours; but ye shall not be so, Luk. 22. 25. 26.

Exposit. Our Saviour forbids them to strive, because there must be no superioritie among them, which was the object of their strife.

This argument *Propertius* setteth our thus;

The Mariners talke is of the winds,
the Plowmans of his oxe;
The Souldiers of his skars and wounds,
the Shepheards of his flocks.

Exposit. So the winds are the object of the Mariners; oxen of the Ploughmen; skars and wounds of the Souldiers; sheepe of the Shepheards.

Chap. XI.

Of the Adjunct.

The [a] adiunct is [b] that, to which something is [c] subiected.

[a] *Adiunct*] That which is adjoyned, or added to a thing.

[b] *That*]

[b] *That*] That argument, which hath respect to the subject, as to that, which is subjected to it. [c] *Subiected*] Laid, cast, or set vnder, of *subijcere*; so that the adjunct is that, which is as it were laid vpon, or adjoyned to the subject.

This argument, though it be [a] *lighter then the subiect: yet it is more* [b] *copious, and* [c] *ordinary.* 3 expos.

[a] *Lighter*] The adjunct is said to be lighter, then the subject; first, because the subject is before it in nature; and is almost the reason of the adjuncts being; secondly, because the subjects doe fully refute the adjuncts; for if you take away the subject, the adjuncts perish withall. [b] *Copious*] Of *copia*, plentie; the adjunct is more plentifull; because there is greater store of adjuncts; many belonging to one subject. [c] *Ordinary*] More commonly vsed by vs in reasoning; which perhaps ariseth from the plentie of it.

Therefore we may say of them, as 3

Ovid

Ouid doth of such like.

These things (for so they are) perchance may small be reputed:
But such as helpe not singly, but ioyntly profit.

4 *All things* [a] *good or bad, which belong or happen to the soule, the body, or the whole man, are adiuncts of the soule, the body, the whole man.*

Exposit. [a] *Good or bad*] As vice, vertue; prosperitie, aduersitie; health, sickenesse; riches, povertie.

5 *In a word, whatsoever doth* [a] *externally belong, or happen to any subiect, is an adiunct to it.*

[a] *Externally*] whether the thing it selfe be inward, or outward, if it be no part of the essence, it is an adjunct: as the faculte of speaking is an adjunct to the nature of man.

6 *Now as the place is a subiect: so time is an adiunct, namely, the duration or continuance of things past,*

past, present, future, or to come.

To conclude, all qualities, that are added to any subiect, and are not the causes of it, are adiuncts to it. 7

These qualities are proper or common. Those are proper qualities, or proprieties, which belong to the whole subiect, to it alone, and alwayes; as the faculty of laughing to every man, and to a man at all times; so neighing is proper to an horse; barking to a dogge.

Those are common qualities which are not in such sort proper; that is, which haue not these three properties, but want, at the least, one of them. Exposit.

By this argument the Spouse is described, Cant. 5. 10. 11 12. My loue is white, ruddy; His head as the most fine gold; his locks are bushy, and blacke as a Raven. His eyes are as the eyes of a Doue, by the riuers of waters, washed with milke and fitly set. His cheeks are as a bed of spices, and sweete flowers; his lips like Lillies, &c. Examp.

Here

Expoſit. Here whitneſſe, ruddineſſe, ſwe-
neſſe are adjuncts.

So a mans clothes, weapons, c
company are his adiuncts; as in t
deſcription of *Goliah*. 1 Sam. 17.

Examp. 5.6. &c. *There came a man nam*
Goliah of Gath. He had a helmet
braſſe vpon his head; and a brigand
vpon him; and the weight of his brig
dine was fiue thouſand ſhekels of braſ
and he had bootes of braſſe vpon h
legges, &c. and one bearing a ſheild w
before him.

¶ *There is alſo great vſe of adiunct*
in arguing the ſubiects, where
they are imployed.

Examp. *By this argument Plato proueth tha*
Thoſe Cities are in a miſerable eſta
which need many Phyſitians and Iudg
becauſe there muſt needs be much
temperancy and vniuſt dealing in tho

Expoſit. The reaſon, for more plainneſſe lie
thus:

Where there is much intemp
rancy and vniuſt dealing, thoſe citi
are in a miſerable eſtate.

Whe

Where there neede many Phyſitians and Iudges, there is much intemperancy and vnjuſt dealing. For the office of Phyſitians is to cure diſeaſes, which ariſe for the moſt part of intemperancy; and the office of Iudges is to ſee that every man haue right, by redreſſing the wrongs, that are done or offered. Theſe are the ſubiects, or obiects, with which Phyſitians and Iudges deale.

Thus haue we the category, or place, or head, of conſentany arguments declared; according to which one thing may be ſaid to agree with another: and Hitherto, as to their firſt & ſimple fountaines, all kinds of [a] *vnitie, or (that I may ſo ſpeake) of identitie are to be referred.*

Whatſoeuer may be ſaid in any kind to agree with another thing, or to be one and the ſame with it, is either a cauſe, or an effect, or a ſubiect, or an adiunct. For there are no more meanes of agreement. [a] *Unitie*] being one; identitie, being the ſame, of

Expoſit.

of *vnus* one, and *idem* the same.

Chap. XII.

Of arguments that are divers.

1 *Wee haue declared the nature of a primitiue consentany argument; now followeth a* [a] *dissentany, which dissenteth from the thing it argueth.*

Expos. [a] *Dissentany*] *Dissentire* to disagree, differ, dissent, in any matter whatsoever; as I said of *Consentany*, Chap. 2.

2 *Now dissentany arguments are* [a] *of themselues* [b] *alike manifest; and each of them is* [c] *argued alike by the other.*

Expos. [a] *Of themselues*] Of their owne nature. [b] *Alike manifest*] For there is no difference of διότι and ὅτι, that, and why or how; as there is in consentany arguments; because the dissentanies, that are declared each by other, haue

haue the ſame name and definition; as one contrary is argued of another, one relate of another; not as in conſentanies; the cauſe by the effect, the ſubject by the adjunct: therefore he that knoweth the one, muſt alſo know the other. [c] *Argued alike*] Haue equall force to argue each other; neither can the one be argued by the other, as by that, which is better knowne, or hath more force to argue.

Yet they are made better knowne by their diſagreeing. 3

(*Made better knowne*] If we conſider them together, the diſagreement we find betwixt them, maketh them both better knowne; as health and the benefits thereof; by ſickneſſe and the diſcommodities of it; ſo white by blacke, &c. Expoſit.

Diſſentany arguments are divers or oppoſite. 4

Divers are [a] *diſſentany arguments, which diſagree in* [b] *ſome reſpect onely.* 5

[a] *Diſ-*

Exposit. [a] *Dissentany*] As the cause and the effect were consentany; so those we call diverse are dissentany. [b] *In some Respect*] As consentany arguments agree absolutely or in some respect; so dissentany disagree; the lighter disagreement is set in the former place, because it is neerer to consent. The respect, in which these arguments differ, is the diverse vsing or considering of them, as shall appeare in the examples.

6 *These arguments are commonly knowne by* [a] *these markes, Not this, but that. Although, yet.*

Exposit. [a] *These markes*] These indeede are the most common; but there are also some other now and then; and somtimes none at all.

Examp. *Not faire in beautie but sweet in speech was Vlysses.*

Exposit. *Ovid: Vlysses* might haue been both faire and eloquent: but *Ovid* denieth the former, and affirmeth the latter.

Examp. *Stout Priamond, but not so strong to strike:*
Strong Diamond, but not so stout a Knight:

But

But Triamond was ſtout & ſtrong alike.
Faery Queen: book. 3. cant. 2.

Priamond and *Diamond* might haue beene ſtout and ſtrong alike, as *Triamond* was: but the *Poet* puts this difference betwixt them. Expoſit.

They haue a zeale of God, but not according to knowledge. The *Iewes* might haue had zeale, and that according to knowledge, as true Chriſtians haue; but the Holy Ghoſt telleth vs they wanted the latter. *Rom.* 10. 2. *Examp.* Expoſit.

Though I be rude in ſpeech, yet not in knowledge. 2 Cor. 11. 6. A man may be rude both in ſpeech and knowledge; but the *Apoſtle* denieth the latter of himſelfe, and ſo maketh them two divers. *Examp.* Expoſit.

Though I walke through the valley of the ſhadow of death, I will feare no evill. A man ſo walking may juſtly feare: but the Prophet ſaith he would not feare; Therefore in him to walke in the ſhadow of death, and to feare diſagree as divers things. *Pſalm.* 23. 4. *Examp.* Expoſit.

The vertuous man is free: though bound in chains
Though poore; content; though banisht; yet no strange
Though sicke; in health of minde; secure, in danger
Davis: Can. 2.

Exposit. Though the vertuous man [b]
bound in chaines; yet is he free
though in danger, secure. Here free
and bound in chaines, are diverse
so poore, and content, secure, and
danger.

Chap. XIII.
Of Opposits.

1 [a] *Opposits are* [b] *dissentanies; which*
[c] *wholy disagree.*

Exposit. [a] Opposits] *Opposita* of *opponere* to
set against; so that these argu-
ments are set against each other, and
cannot agree. [b] *Dissentanies*] Dissen-
ting arguments; which set forth or
declare each other by disagreeing.
[c] *Wholy*] Not in some respect only,
as those that are diverse doe; but ut-
terly

erly without possibilitie of agree-ment.

Therefore they cannot befall the [b] *same subiect, in the same respect, the same part, and the same time.* 2

[a] *Therefore*] Because they wholy disagree. [b] *The same subiect*] The same singular party, or thing. Expos.

The three respects are plaine in the examples.

So [a] *Socrates cannot be blacke and white in the* [b] *same part of his body: father and sonne of the same partie: sicke and well at the same time. But he may be white in one part of his body, and blacke in another; the father of this child, the sonne of that man: well to day, sicke to morrow.* Examp.

[a] *Socrates*] This name is put for example; the thing is true of all men. Expos.

[b] *The same part*] By part is not meant whole member, arme, hand, finger; but every part of any of these, or the like. Where a blacke spot is, in the very

very ſame place there cannot be white alſo, though cloſe to it the may.

3 [a] *Therefore whenſoever one of the oppoſits, is affirmed, the other i* [b] *thereby denied.*

Expoſit. [a] *Therefore*] Becauſe they cannot both be together; therefore if you ſay the one is here or there, you den that the other is there. [b] *Thereby*] I thoſe Arguments, that wee call *Di verſe*; if you affirme the one, you d ny the other; but not thereby. Fo when *Ovid* ſaid, that *Vlyſſes* was elo quent, he did not thereby deny th he was faire; he might well enoug haue beene eloquent and beautifu too. But in *Oppoſits*, if you ſay *So crates* is ſicke, you cannot ſay he well at the ſame inſtant, but by ſay ing he is ſicke, you deny he is well.

4 *Oppoſits are Diſparats, or Contra ries.*

Expoſit. [a] *Diſparats are* [b] *oppoſits,* [c] *one which is* [d] *alike oppoſed to many.*

[a] *Di*

[a] *Disparats*] *Disparata* of *Dispar* vnequall; when the one differs from the other; the word is somewhat generall; but we haue no fitter. [b] *Opposits*] Therfore they wholy disagree, and cannot be joyned together. [c] *One of which*] Every one of which; for, as it is in the last word, they are more then two, and haue no certaine number. [d] *Alike*] Æqually, after the same manner of disagreeing; as blacke differeth after the same manner, from yellow and from red, as being disparate to each; though it differ not in like measure, from the mixture of the colours.

Greene, ashcolour, red, are middle colours, betwixt blacke and white, every one of which is in like manner opposed to both the extreames, blacke and white, and to the other middle colours. So liberalitie and covetousnesse dissent, as disparats, from each other. So a man, a tree, a stone, and innumerable such things are disparats; neither can the same thing be a man, a tree, a stone. Examp.

It is the voyce of a God, and not of a man. Act. 12. 22.

Some say that, thou art Iohn the Baptist; some Elias, and other, Ieremias, or one of the Prophets; but thou art Christ the sonne of the living God. Math. 16. 14. 16.

Iohn Baptist, Elias, and *Christ,* differ as *Disparats,* the one from the other.

So differ silver, and gold, and corruptible things from the precious bloud of Christ. 1 *Pet.* 1. 18. *You were not redeemed from your vaine conversation, with corruptible things, as silver & gold, but with the precious bloud of Christ.*

Chap. XIIII.

Of Contraries.

1 *Contraries are* [a] *opposits, whereof* [b] *one is opposed to* [c] *one onely.*

Exposit. [a] *Opposits*] Therefore whatsoever hath beene said hitherto of *opposits* in generall, must be vnderstood of *contraries* also. [b] *One to one*] Not one to many, as in *disparats*; therefore

fore in *Contraries*, there is greater oppoſition, and more diſagreement.

[c] *One onely*] One of the ſame kinde; for it may be oppoſed to divers of ſeverall kinds: as, He that ſeeth is oppoſed to that, which ſeeth not; and to him, that is blind.

Contraries are affirmatiue or Negatiue. 2

Affirmatiue, when both affirme ſomewhat; as Relatiues or Adverſatiues. 3

[a] *Relatiues are* [b] *cõtraries affirming; the one whereof* [c] *conſiſts by the* [d] *mutuall relation to the other.* 4

[a] *Relatiues*] They are commonly called *Relats*; I keepe the word, which is already knowne, and vſed in Grammar. Both come of *Referor* to be referred, or to haue reference to. [b] *Contraries affirming*] Though they be contrary either to other; yet both of them affirme ſomewhat; as Father and Sonne; neither of them deny; as ſeing, and not ſeing doe. Expoſit.

c *Consists*] Hath its being or nature.
d *Mutuall relation*] Interchangeable reference; either being referred to other; as the ſonne is the fathers ſon; and the father is the ſonnes father; Having a ſervant maketh a maiſter; and having a maiſter maketh a ſervant.

5 Expoſit. *And thence are they called Relatiues.* Namely, of that mutuall relation. As a father is he, which hath a ſonne; and a ſonne is he, which hath a father.

6 *And becauſe of* a *this mutuall relation, Relatiues are ſaid to be together in nature: ſo that he, which* b *perfectly knowes the one, knowes the other alſo.*

Expoſit. a *This mutuall.*] For by reaſon of this, each is cauſe of being to the other. b *Perfectly knowes*] He that knowes, what it is, to be a father, knowes alſo what it is, to be a ſonne: and contrariwiſe.

Examp. *And it ſhall be as with the people, ſo with the Prieſt; as with the ſervant, ſo with*

with the maiſter ; as with the maid, ſo with the miſtris ; as with the buyer, ſo with the ſeller ; as with the lender, ſo with the borrower ; as with the taker of vſury, ſo with the giver of vſury to him. Eſay. 24. 1. 2. Prieſt and people ; Maiſter and ſervant ; Miſtris & maid, &c. are relatiues.

They gaue him a peice of broyled fiſh, and an hony combe, and he tooke it. *Luk.* 24. 42. Here they gaue, and he tooke, are relatiues.

Betwixt Prince and ſubiect, there is as neceſſary a relation, as betwixt father and Sonne ; and as there is no man a father, but to his child ; ſo is none a Prince, but to his owne ſubiects. Sr Phil: Sid: Arcad. lib. 5.

Father and ſonne, Prince and ſubject, are relatiues.

So to rule & to obey. *Daviſican.* 32.

For where deſire doth beare the ſway,
The heart muſt rule ; the head obey.

So brother and brother, children and parents. *The brother ſhall deliver vp the brother to death, and the father*

the

the child, and the children ſhall riſe vp againſt their parents. Mat. 10. 27.

7 *But an argument of* [a] *ſuch relation hath no* [b] *contrarietie in it; nay it argueth* [c] *mutuall cauſes; as I am your father; therefore you are my ſonne.*

Expoſit. [a] *Of ſuch Relation.*] Where Relatiues ſo argue, or declare each other. [b] *No contrarietie*] There is no contrarietie at all betwixt them. [c] *Mutuall cauſes*] They argue each other, as the cauſes each of other.

8 *But when I ſay; I am your father; therefore am I not your ſonne: then are they* [a] *contraries indeed.*

Expoſit. [a] *Contraries*] For the ſame partie cannot be father, and ſonne of the ſame partie; becauſe Relatiues thus conſidered are Oppoſits.

CHAP.

Chap. XV.

Of Adversatiues.

[a] *Adversatiues are contraries affirming, which are* [b] *alwayes* [c] *directly opposite each to other.* 1

[a] *Adversatiues*] These are commonly termed *contraries*; but it is manifest, that there are diverse *contraries*, beside these: this name is also knowne and vsed in Grammar. Exposit.

[b] *Alwayes*] It seemes to signifie absolutely.

[c] *Directly*] As two pillars, that are set right against each other in a building; so that if you bring them together, you pull the house on your head, with *Sampson*.

Warre yeelds no safetie, 'tis peace we heartily sue for. Vir. Æp. 11. Examp.

There is a time to plant, and a time to plucke vp that which is planted; a time to breake downe, and a time to build vp; a time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together; a time to get and a time to loose; a time to loue and a time to hate; a time of warre, and a time of peace.

peace. Eccles. 3. 2. 3. 4. 5. &c.

Woe be to all them, that call good evill, and evill good. Isai. 5. 20.

Which iustifie the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousnesse of the righteous from him. Isay. 5. 23.

Yee cannot serue God and Mammon. Mat. 6. 24.

So libertie and freedome are opposed in that Proverbiall rime.

Better it is a poore house to hold,
Then to lye in prison with fetters of gold.

Chap. XVI.

Of Contradictories.

1 *Negatiue contraries are* [a] *they, whereof the one affirmes, the other denieth, the* [b] *same thing.*

Expos. [a] *They*] Those arguments. [b] *The same thing*] For if the one affirme one thing, and the other deny another thing, and not the same, what gainesaying is there?

Nega-

Negatiue contraries, are Contradictories, or Priuatiues. 2

Contradictories are negatiue contraries, the one whereof denieth [a] *every where; or generally.* Exposit.

[a] *Every where*] That is in all causes, matters, or subjects. As just, not just; a living creature, not a living creature. Is, Is not, are contradictories. *Iust not Iust*] Not just may be sayd of any thing; as an horse is not just; a stone is not a living creature; a Griffin is not; or, there is no Griffin.

Some beleeued the things that were spoken, and some beleeued not. Act. 28. 24. *Festus said; Paul thou art besides thy selfe. But he said I am not mad.* Act. 26. 24. Beleeued & beleeued not are contradictories. So in the second example; Besides one selfe, and not mad. Examp.

CHAP.

Chap. XVII.
Of Privatiues.

1 *Privatiues are negatiue contraries, the one whereof denyes in* [a] *that ſubiect onely, wherein the affirmatiue is by* [b] *nature.*

Expoſit. [a] *That ſubiect*] Wee may ſay generally in that thing; but this word *ſubiect* ſignifieth, that they be adjuncts, which are affirmed and denied. [b] *Is by nature*] The contrary to that which is denyed doth naturally agree to the ſubject, or thing, whereof it is denyed; as blindneſſe is denied onely of thoſe things, which naturally haue ſight. Therefore a ſtone cannot be ſayd to be blind.

2 *And here, or in this head, or place, that which is affirmed, is called the* [a] *habit, that which is denyed, the* [b] *priuation, or priuatiue.*

Expoſit. [a] *Habit*] Of *habere* to haue; habit ſignifieth a qualitie, or facultie, which the thing hath, or might haue. [b] *Priuation*

vation] Of *priuare* to depriue or bereaue, of ſomthing which is or might be in the ſubject, whereof it is denyed. Privation, if we will keepe that word, muſt ſignifie, not the act of depriving, but the thing, which is wanting: as ſight in blindneſſe.

So motion and reſt. *So Ieſus wearied with his Iourney, ſat thus on the Well.* Ioh. 4. 6. Iourneying and ſitting ſtill are priuatiues. Sight and blindneſſe. Hearing and deafenesſe. *Examp.*

What els but blind is he, that nothing ſees
But deafe, that cannot heare.
Davis: Madrig. 19.

So riches and poverie. *Thou ſayſt I am rich, and encreaſed with goods, and haue neede of nothing; and knoweſt not, that thou art wretched, and miſerable, and poore.* Revel. 3. 17.

So death, and life. *In that he died, he died vnto ſinne once; but in that he liveth, he liveth vnto God.* Rom. 6. 10.

Speech and ſilence. *I was dumbe with ſilence, I held my peace even from*

good; while I was musing the fire burnt; then spake I with my tongue. Psal. 29. 2.

3 *Thus haue I declared the Category, head or place, of Dissentany arguments; from whence all* [a] *difference, that can be of any one thing from another, is to be fetched.*

Expos. [a] *All difference*] Whatsoever difference can reasonably be imagined betwixt or among things, is to be found in some one of these *Dissentanies.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Equalls.

1 *Hitherto wee haue declared the nature of positiue arguments, both consentanies, and dissentanies.*

2 *Comparatiue arguments, are those arguments, which are compared together.*

3 *Although comparatiue arguments are equally known, the one as well*

as

as the other in respect of [a] *comparison; yet the one of them may be better known, and evident to some man, then the other.*

[a] *Comparison*] For comparison onely maketh them equall, or vnequall, like, or vnlike. Exposit.

Many times they are briefly signified by certaine markes. 4

Sometime they are set out at large, by their parts; which are called [a] *Proposition and Reddition.* 5

[a] *Proposition*] Because this word is of necessary vse, in the second part of *Logicke*, I would gladly spare it in this place, if I could tell how to supply the want of it handsomely; perhaps we might call the one, the *Declarer*; the other, the *Declared*. Exposit.

Comparisons, though they be [a] *fained, doe argue, and* [b] *breed beliefe.* 6

[a] *Be fained*] The declarer, or former part may be a thing, that hath no true being, as diverse cõparisons brought Exposit.

from ſtones, and plants imagined.
[b] *Breed beliefe*] Declare and make knowne the thing wee handle, yea cauſe vs to beleeue that it is, as the compariſon ſignifieth.

7 *Compariſon is in Quantitie or Qualitie.*

Expoſit. Things are compared in reſpect of their quantitie or qualitie.

8 *Quantitie is that, by which things compared are ſaid to be ſo great, or ſo little.*

Expoſit. Quantitie, in *Logicke*, ſignifies not onely height, bredth, thickneſſe; but alſo all kinde of things; wherein one thing may be conceived to be equall or vnequall to another.

9 *Compariſon in quantity is of things Equall, or vnequall.*

10 *Thoſe things are equall, which haue the ſame quantitie.*

11 *Therefore an argument of equalitie is, when a thing is declared by that which is equall to it.*

The

The ſignes and markes of equalitie, are one. 12

Both the Cherubs were of one meaſure, and one ſize. 1 Kings. 6. 25. Examp. 1.

Æquall. *Theſe laſt haue wrought but one houre, and thou haſt made them æquall to vs.* Mat. 20. 12. 2

As much. *Sinners lend to ſinners, to receiue as much againe.* Luk. 6. 34. 3

As, as. *The length of the Citie is as large, as the bredth.* Rev. 21. 16. 4

Deniall of inequalitie. *If Balak would giue me his houſe full of ſilver and gold, I cannot goe beyond the word of the Lord my God, to doe leſſe or more.* Numb. 22. 18. 5 1

I ſuppoſe I was not a whit behind the very chiefeſt Apoſtles. 2 Cor. 11. 5. 2

What is it, wherein yee were inferiour to other Churches? 2 Cor. 12. 13.

Sometime the propoſition, and reddition are diſtinctly ſet downe. 13

As is his part, that goeth downe to the battaile, ſo ſhall his part be, that tarieth by the ſtuffe. They ſhall part alike. 1 Sam. 30. 34. Examp.

How much she hath glorified her selfe, and lived delitiously; so much torment, and sorrow giue her. Rev. 18. 7.

As far, as the East is from the West, so farre hath he removed our sinnes from vs. As the heaven is high above earth, so great is his mercy toward them that feare him. Psal. 103. 11. 12.

Wisedome excelleth folly, as far, as the light excelleth darknesse. Eccleſiaſt. 2. 13.

14 *Sometimes the markes are left out.*

While loue in you did liue, I onely liu'd in you.
While you for me did burne, for you alone I burn'd,
While you did sigh for me, for you I sigh'd & mourn'd.
Daviſ: ſon. 2.

To this place belong those [a] *consectaries; springing indeede from contraries, but handled by comparison of æqualitie.*

Expoſit. [a] *Consectaries*] Things that follow vpon each other; of the Latine *Consectari* to follow.

When that thy Father thou dost Maister call,
Thou dost confesse thy selfe a slaue, and thrall.
Martial. M

Maiſter or Lord and ſlaue are relatiues; yet here they are handled as æqualls: if he be thy Lord, thou art his ſlaue. Expoſit.

But this is more common in Aduerſatiues; ſeeing they confeſſe, that there is force enough in naughtineſſe to make men vnhappie; muſt they not alſo yeeld, that there is the ſame force in goodneſſe to make men happie? Tuſc. Quæſt. 5. Examp.

So, being prouoked, ſometime we pay like for like. The Phariſes demaunded of our Lord Ieſus, by what authoritie he did thoſe things; He anſwers them; I will alſo aske you one thing: The Baptiſme of Iohn was it from heaven or of men? And they anſwered; Wee cannot tell. And he ſaid vnto them; Neither tell I you, by what authoritie I doe theſe things. Mat. 21. 23. &c. Examp.

An example of a compariſon of æqualitie, that is but fayned, we haue in *Daviſons Poëms* out of *Martiall.*

Why doe your wife and you ſo ill agree:
Since you in manners ſo well matched be?
Thou brazen fac'd; ſhe impudently bold,

Thou ſtill doſt braule: ſhe evermore doth ſcold.
Thou ſeldome ſober art; ſhe often drunke.
Dav: Epigram.

Chap. XIX.

Of the Greater.

1 *Vnequall things are thoſe, which haue not the ſame quantity whereof the one is* [a] *Greater, the other Leſſe.*

2 [*a] Greater] In *Logicke* that is counted greater, which exceeds that, wherewith it is compared, in Greatneſſe, authoritie, power, excellency, number, or in any thing whatſoever.

3 *The* [a] *Greater is that, the* [b] *quantitie whereof doth* [c] *exceede.* *

Expoſit. [*a] *Greater*] In *Logicke*, &c. [b] *Quantitie.*] Of things vnequall, the one muſt needs be greater, the other leſſe. [c] *Exceed*] The quantitie of the other which is leſſe.

The

The proper markes thereof are ſuch as theſe. Not onely, but alſo. 4

I am ready, not to be bound onely, but alſo to dye for the name of the Lord Ieſus. Act. 21. 13. Examp.

The Apoſtle was diſſwaded from going to *Ieruſalem*, becauſe there he ſhould be bound for the Lord Ieſus. He ſheweth his willingneſſe to be bound, by the greater, his willingneſſe to dye for him. Expoſit.

Rather this then that. *I had rather be a dore-keeper in the houſe of my God, then dwell in the tents of wickedneſſe.* Pſal. 84. 10. Examp.

It is a greater happineſſe to be a dore-keeper in the Lords houſe, then to dwell in the tents of the wicked. The quantitie of that exceeds this. Expoſit.

More then. *The Lord loveth the gates of Sion more, then all the dwellings of Iacob.* Pſal. 82. 2. Examp.

The quantitie of his loue to *Sion* is greater. Expoſit.

Grammaticall compariſon. *To obey is better, then ſacrifice: and to hearken,* Examp.

then the fat of Rams. 1 Sam. 15. 22.

Examp. Much more. *If when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne, much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life.* Rom. 5. 6. 7.

Expos. The thing argued, is our being saved by the life of the Sonne of God; this is declared by the greater, our being reconciled when we were enemies; For the quantitie of loue in this exceedeth that in the other.

Examp. *He found no stedfastnesse in his servants, and laid folly vpon his Angels; how much more on them, that dwell in houses of clay.* Iob. 4. 18.

Expos. The thing argued, is the corruption of men, that which argues, is the imperfection of Angels; the argument is, the greater righteousnesse or perfection of the Angels, which exceeds the perfection of men.

Examp. *Two Kings stood not before him, how shall we stand?* 2 Kings. 10. 4.

Expos. The lesse power of the *Samaritans* is argued by the greater power of two Kings, *Ieram*, and *Ahaziah*.

An

An example of a feined compariſon is that. *If the Prophet had bid thee doe ſome great thing, wouldeſt thou not haue done it? How much rather then, when he ſayth; Waſh and be cleane?* Examp.

Waſhing the leſſe, is argued by ſome greater thing, which it is conceived the Prophet might haue enjoyned. Expoſit.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Leſſe.

The leſſe is that, the quantitie whereof is exceeded: by that, which it argueth. 1

The markes, whereby it is knowne, are Grammaticall compariſon.

A Stone is heavie, and the ſand weightie; but a fooles wrath more heavie then them both. Prov. 27. 3. Examp.

A fooles wrath as the greater, is argued by the leſſe weight of ſand, and ſtone. Expoſit.

Duſt

Examp. *Dust is lighter then a feather:*
And the wind more light then either;
But a womans fickle mind,
More then feather, dust, or wind.
Dav: divis:

Expos. The lightnesse of a fickle mind, exceeds the lightnesse of wind, feather, and dust. And is declared as the greater, by these which are lesse.

Examp. More then. *I laboured more abundantly, then they all.* 1 Cor. 15. 10.

Expos. The Apostles greater labour is set out, by the lesse labour of other.

Examp. *It is easier for a Camel to goe through the eye of a needle, then for a rich man to enter into the Kingdome of God.* Luk. 18. 25.

Expos. The hardnesse for a rich man to enter into the kingdome of heaven, is set out by the lesse; as a Camels going through the eye of a needle; which is not so hard a thing.

Examp. Not like. *Salomon in all his glory was not like one of these.* Mat. 6. 29.

Expos. The greater glory of the Lilies, is declared by the lesse glory of *Salomon*.

Deniall

Deniall of æqualitie. *It ſhall be more tolerable for Sodom & Gomorrah in the day of Iudgement, then for that Citie.* Mat. 18. 15. — Examp.

The greatneſse of the Cities puniſhment is ſhewed, by the leſſe puniſhment of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*. — Expoſit.

Time waſteth yeares & moneths & dayes, & houres:
Time doth conſume fame, riches, wit, and ſtrength;
Time kills the greeneſt hearbs, and ſweeteſt flowers;
Time weares out youth, and beauties pride at length:
Yet ſhall not time vpon my heart prevaile:
Nor any time ſhall make my loue to faile.
Dav: ſon. 27.

The long continuance of his loue is manifeſted by the ſhort continuance of other things, as yeares, moneths, dayes, houres, fame, riches, &c. — Expoſit.

Sometime the marke is left out.

A garden encloſed is my ſiſter, my Spouſe; a ſpring ſhut vp; a fountaine ſealed. Cantic. 4. 12. — Examp.

Of this kind are Metaphors which alwayes containe a Similitude. As when God is termed a rocke: in reſpect

ſpect of himſelfe, he is ſo termed, becauſe he is ſtrong, and vnmoueable as a rocke is: in regard of vs, that, he is a ſure defence, and ſhelter, as a rocke is.

4 *The parts of a ſimilitude are ſometime* [a] *laid out, at large; either ſeuered, or ioyned.*

Expoſit. [a] *Laid out*] The former examples cloſe vp the ſimilitude in one word, or two; thoſe that follow, lay them open to our view.

5 *A diſiunct ſimilitude, or ſeuered likeneſſe is, when there are foure* [a] *termes* [b] *diſtinctly ſet downe.*

Expoſit. [a] *Termes*] The parts of the propoſition and reddition are called termes: which ſhall be noted in the examples.
[b] *Diſtinctly*] So that there be two in the propoſition: two other in the reddition.

Examp. *As the waxe melteth at the fire: ſo let the vngodly periſh at the preſence of God.* Pſal. 68. 2.

Expoſit. The thing argued is the periſhing of

of the vngodly, at the presence of God; which is set downe in the reddition or latter part. The thing arguing is melting of waxe at the fire: delivered in the proposition or former part. The parts or tearmes in the proposition are, Waxe, Fire; in the reddition, vngodly, the presence of God.

As the Hart brayeth after the rivers of water; so panteth my soule after thee O God. The foure termes are; the heart; the river; the soule; God. *Psal.* 42. 1. Examp. Expos.

As the body without breath is dead; so faith without workes is dead also. Iames. 2. 26. The body, breath; faith; workes. Examp. Expos.

Sometime one of the markes is left out, and the parts displaced.

Husbands loue your wiues; even as Christ loved the Church. Examp.

The termes are, Christ, Church; Husbands; wiues; The reddition or latter part is set formost, the proposition in the latter place. The similitude orderly set downe runneth Expos.

thus;

thus; *As Christ loved the Church, so must men loue their wiues.* Eph. 5.29.

Sometime both markes are left out.

Examp. *Siluer, drosse, ouerlaid vpon a potsheard; burning lips, and an euill heart.* Pro. 26. 23.

Expoſit. Thus lies the likeneſſe; As a potsheard couered with ſilver; ſo are burning lips, and a wicked heart; both faire outwardly, within filthy. The foure termes are diſtinct. A potsheard, ſilver; burning lips, a wicked heart.

6 *A* [a] *ioyned or continued ſimilitude is, when the* [b] *ſecond terme is to the third, as the firſt is to the ſecond.*

Expoſit. [a] *Ioyned*] It is ſo called, becauſe the ſecond terme is continued in the reddition, in the third place; and not a ſeuerall new terme, which was not in the propoſition. [b] *The ſecond*] There are but three termes in all; therefore one muſt be repeated; which is the ſecond; and that belongeth alike to the firſt, & to the third;

ex-

examples will make it plainer.

As the father hath loued me, so haue I loued you. Ioh. 15.9. *Examp.*

In this similitude there are but three termes. The 1. father. 2. I. 3. you. I the second terme is referred to you the third, as the father the first terme is to I the second. Thus perhaps it will be easier. As God loued Christ, so Christ loued his Disciples. Christ is so affected to his Disciples, as God the Father is to Christ. *Expos.*

Sometimes here also one marke is omitted, and the parts displaced.

Oughtest not thou to haue had pittie on thy fellow seruant; as I had pittie on thee? Mat. 18.33. *Examp.*

The three termes are 1. I the Lord, 2. thou the seruant, 3. thy fellow-seruant. It is thus to be disposed; As I the Lord had pittie on thee, so thou the seruant shouldst haue had pittie on thy fellow seruant. The second terme the seruant, should haue beene to the third terme his fellow seruant, as the Lord the first terme, was to the seruant the second. *Expos.*

Fai-

Examp. *Fained similitudes are of as much force to argue, as true; So Nathan dealt with David.* 2 Sam. 12. 1. 2. 7.

So the Prophet reprooved Ahab. 1 Kings. 20. 38. 39. 42.

In this kind *Æsops* fables excell, but far aboue them are the most excellent Parables, or likenesses of our Lord Iesus; whereof the Gospell is full. *Mat.* 13. 3. 24. 31. 33. *Luk.* 15. 4. 8. 11.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Vnlike.

1 *Vnlike things are those, which have a* [a] *diverse qualitie.*

[a] *Diverse qualitie*] Which differ from each other in qualitie.

2 *The proper notes of vnlikenesse or vnlike.*

1 *The fourth beast was vnlike to all the beasts before it.* Dan. 7. 7. 19.

2 Another. *There is another glory of the Sunne, another of the Moone, and another of the Starres: For one Starre differeth*

fereth from another in glory. 1 Cor. 15. 41.

Deniall of likeneſſe is moſt common. *There is none like me in all the earth.* Exod. 9. 14. 3

Who is like vnto thee, O Lord, among the Gods? Exod. 15 11.

Not as, ſo. *But not as the offence, ſo alſo is the gift.* Rom. 5. 15. 4

And not as it was by one that ſinned, ſo is the gift. Rom. 5. 16.

Many times there is no mark; and the vnlikeneſſe is fully ſet out; as in the *Epigram* of *Catullus.*

The Sun that ſets, againe ſhall riſe:
When our ſhort light once hidden lies.
Perpetuall night ſhall cloſe our eyes.

To which this may be oppoſed in the ſame kind of Compariſon.

The Sunne you ſee ſo often riſe,
You ſee as often leaue the skies.
But we, when one ſhort night is paſt,
Shall liue in light that aye ſhall laſt.

Chap. XXII.

Of Conjugates.

1 *Hitherto we haue ſhewed the nature of primitiue arguments; now follow* [a] *Derivatiue.*

Expoſit. [a] *Derivatiue*] Of *rivus* a river or brooke; *Derivatiues* as it were divers ſtreames drawne, or iſſuing from the ſame fountaine.

2 *Derivatiues haue the ſame force to argue, that the* [a] *Primitiues haue, from which they are derived.*

Expoſit. [a] *Primitiues*] Thoſe, that come of the cauſes, argue as the cauſes doe; thoſe, that are drawne from the ſubjects or adjuncts, haue the ſame force to declare that, they argue, which the ſubject and adjunct haue.

3 *Derivatiues are* 1. *Coniugates or Notation*, 2. *Diſtribution or Definition.*

Expoſit. Wee can find no more any true kinds of Derivatiues then we can of cauſes.

[a] *Coniugates*

[a] *Coniugates are* [b] *names diuerſly derived from the ſame beginning.* 4

Of the ſame theame, or roote.

[a] *Coniugates*] Of *coniungo* to joyne. Thoſe that are joyned, as it were, by kindred; as, Iuſt, Iuſtice, Iuſtly. Expoſit.

[b] *Names*] That is, words; not nownes: for words, whether they be nownes, verbs, or adverbs; are names of the things, that they ſignifie: as Iuſt is the name of ſuch a man, or action: Iuſtice, the name of ſuch a habit, or qualitie: Iuſtly, the name of doing according to Iuſtice. Theſe words, and the like belong to Grammar; but it is *Logicke*, that teacheth vs to reaſon by them.

In Coniugates there is a marke of Conſentany arguments. 5

He that doth righteouſneſſe is righteous. 1 Ioh. 3. 7. Examp.

Here the cauſe is argued by the effect; a righteous man is the cauſe of righteous actions. Expoſit.

A good man out of the good treaſure of his heart, bringeth forth good things, Examp.

and an evill man out of the evill treasury evill things. Math. 12. 35.

Expos. A good heart is the cause of good things: an evill of evill.

Exam. *Thy lawfull wife faire Lalia needs must be, For shee was forc't by Law to marry thee.*
Davis: Epigram.

Law maketh things lawfull.

Answere not a foole according to his folly. Prov. 26. 4.

A foole is the subject; folly the adjunct.

Here both arguments have the same name: Conjugats.

Chap. XXIII.

Of Notation.

1 [a] *Notation is the* [b] *interpretation of a name*; or word.

Expos. [a] *Notation*] Of *Nota*, a marke, marking out; that is, declaring whence the word is. [b] *Interpretation.*] It is that which in Greeke is called ἔτυμολογία, the true reason of the word, how it commeth to signifie this, or that.

T her

There is no name of any thing, [a] *deriuatiue, or compound, but if it were* [b] *skilfully given, the reason of it may be drawn from* [c] *some primitiue argument.* 2

[a] *Derivatiue*] For primitiue words come from the will of man, who deuiseth names for things; as the Lord God himselfe appointed the Hebrew primitiue words; from which derivatiues were framed by men, as occasion offered it selfe. [b] *skilfully*] Many haue failed much in this skill; that it is (I thinke) impossible, to shew such a reason of every derivatiue, and compound word. [c] *Some*] Either absolute, or comparatiue. Expos.

From the cause. *She shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of man.* Gen. 2. 25. Examp.

From the Effect. *Thou shalt call his name Iesus, Saviour, for he shall saue his people from their sinnes.* Mat. 1. 21.

From the subject. We call men Diuines, Lawyers, Physicians; because of the object whereabout they are

imployed; *viz.* Divinitie, Law, Phy-
ſicke.

From the ſubject place is that of the
Poët. (cal-

From Court, it ſeemes, men courteſie ha-
For that it there moſt vſeth to abound.
Faer. Qu: book. 6. Cant.

From the adjunct. *Thy name ſhall b*
Abraham; for a Father of many Na-
ons haue I made thee. Gen. 17.5.

For *Abraham* in the Hebrew is the
father of a multitude.

Nabal, foole, is his name, and folly
Nabalah, is with him. 1 Sam. 25.25.

There is alſo notation from Diſſer-
tanies.

Examp. *And from Comparatiues; as a kind*
of hearbe is called a Mandrake, becauſe
the roote of it reſembles the faſhion of a
man.

The [a] *name* [b] *argues the notation,*
as the Notation doth the name.

[a] *Name*] In this place, or Category
of *Logicke*, the arguments haue diuers
names; the one is called the name,
the other the Notation. [b] *Argues*]

Proue,

Proues, declares; the one is æqually, and alike argued by the other; As full of courage, therefore courageous. Here the notation declares the name. Courageous, therefore full of courage. Where the name argues the notation.

Chap. XXIIII.

Of Distribution.

There remaine now of Derivatiue arguments, Distribution and Definition. 1

In [a] *each whereof there is an* [b] *affection of* [c] *reciprocation.* 2.

Expos.

[a] *Each*] Both in Distribution and in Definition. [b] *Affection*] A fitnesse, or proprenes to argue each other. [c] *Reciprocation*] *Reciprocare* is to returne thether whence we came; as the water doth, when it ebbs. Now by this, the mutuall or interchangeable arguing of the parts, is signified;

the particulars will make this better vnderstood.

3 *In Distribution the reciprocation is betwixt the parts, and the whole.*

Exposit. For all the parts, and the whole, being all one, (the whole is nothing but all the parts) as the whole argueth all the parts; so all the parts argue the whole; as being one and the same thing. Invention and Iudgement are nothing els but *Logicke*. A soule and a body are nothing els but a man. *Logicke* is nothing els but invention and judgement. A man is nothing els but a soule and a body. So each of these, the whole and the parts, returne into other.

4 [a] *Distribution is, when the whole is divided into parts.*

Exposit. [a] *Distribution*] *Tribuere* to giue; *distribuere* to giue by parts, or peeces; distribution, dividing into parts; as it were giving the thing in parts.

5 *The whole is that, which* [a] *containeth parts.*

[a] *Con-*

[a] *Containeth*] Hath parts, or consists of parts; conteining doth not signifie here, keeping within it; as a vessell doth containe liquor. Expos.

Whatsoever hath parts, is the, or a, whole.

A part is that, which is conteined of the whole; as a peece thereof. 6

As the dividing of the whole into parts, is called Distribution; so the gathering of the parts together, to make vp the whole, is called Induction; 7

That is, bringing in, of *Inducere* to bring in. Expos.

Distribution, and Induction are all one; but that the former proceedeth from the whole to the parts; the latter from the parts to the whole.

A Distribution is made of arguments, which agree with the whole, but disagree one with another. 8

Precepts of art, which propound distributions, must consist of consentany arguments, because the whole, and the parts agree, as cause and effect, Expos.

fect, or effect and cauſe. But the parts conſidered one with another are diſſentanies: *Logicke*, and Invention, and Iudgement, are effect and cauſe. Invention and judgement are oppoſits, Adverſatiues.

9 *Therfore the Diſtribution is ſo much the more accurate, perfect, by how much greater, the agreement of the parts is with the whole, and the diſagreement of them one with another.*

Expoſit. Since the parts muſt be all one with the whole, the more they agree, the better is the thing diſtributed; and ſince the parts muſt diſagree among themſelues, the more they diſagree the rightlier they are made divers parts; as thoſe, that cannot be the ſame.

CHAP.

Chap. XXV.

Of Distribution by the Causes.

The first Distribution, is by arguments absolutely consentany; that is, by the causes, and effects. 1

A distribution by or into the causes, is, when the parts are the [a] *causes of the whole.* 2

[a] *Causes.*] Those causes whereof it consists; or whereof the whole is made; as when *Logicke* is parted into Invention and Iudgement, Man into soule and body, Grammar into Etymologie and Syntaxe. Expos.

Here, that is in this kind of distribution, the distribution into the [a] *integrall and members is most commended.* 3

[a] *Integrall*] *Integrum* in Latine, the whole; but such a whole, as is constituted or made by the parts, which are called members; wee might not vnfitly perhaps call it the body, which Expos.

which is made of the members: but the word is ſomewhat too particular.

4 *The integrall is the whole, to [a] which the parts are eſſentiall.*

Expoſit. To which the parts giue eſſence or being. As *Logicke* is nothing elſe, but Invention and Iudgement, by which it is conſtituted, or made to be: ſo, man is nothing, but ſoule and body. Therefore the members are, in order of nature, before the integrall; as the cauſe is conceived to be before the effect.

5 *A member is a part of the Integrall.* Such a part, as is eſſentiall to it; for every member containeth part of the matter; all together containe the forme alſo.

Examp. *So Grammar is divided into Etymologie and Syntaxe: Rhetoricke into Elocution, and Action: Logicke into Invention and Iudgement; for theſe arts are conſtituted or made of theſe parts.*

6 *This Diſtribution is chiefly vſed, when we haue ſome long diſcourſe*

to

to make, as in Orations and Sermons.

This kind of argument is ſometimes otherwiſe handled: either from the parts to the whole; or from the whole to the parts. 7

Some men count Iudith faire: I thinke not ſo;
For ſtreight, white, tall, I am content ſhee goe:
Theſe parts I grant the whole, faire, I deny,
Sweet, grace, and favour none in her I ſpie.
Mary is faire; all faire from top to toe;
Sweet, grace, and favour, in her onely flow.
Catullus.

Here the whole, faire, is denyed, becauſe ſome part, ſweete, grace, or favour, is wanting. Expoſit.

Chap. XXVI.

Of diſtribution by the Effects, where of Genus and Species.

Diſtribution by the effects is, when the parts are effects. 1

Of other Shepheards, ſome were running after their ſheepe ſtrayed beyond Examp.

beyond their bounds; some delighting their eyes with seeing them nibble upon the short, and sweet grasse; some medicining the sicke ewes; some setting a bell for an ensigne of a sheepish squadron; some, with more leasure, devising new games of exercising their bodies, and delighting their minds. Arcad. lib. 1.

Expos. The Shepheards are here divided by their effects, running, looking, medicining, &c.

2 *Of all distributions of* [a] *this kinde, that of the* [b] *Genus into the Species excelleth.*

Expos. [a] *Of this kind*] Where the parts are effects. [b] *Genus*] The generall or kind into the specialls, or sorts.

3 *The Genus, or generall, is the whole that is* [a] *essentiall to the parts.*

Expos. [a] *Essentiall*] Giues being or essence to the parts; quite contrary to the Integrall, which receiveth being from the parts.

4 *The Species, speciall, or sort, is a part of the Genus, or generall.*

Such

Sucha part as receiveth being from it.

So, art is the generall or genus to Grammar, Logicke, Rhetoricke, Arithmeticke, Geometry, and the reſt. For it cõtaineth the generall eſſence of al theſe; that is, an orderly fram of precepts, for inſtruction in ſomthing profitable to man. So is Grammar, for ſpeech; Rhetoricke, for pleading; Logicke for reaſoning; Arithmetick for numbring; Geometry for meaſuring; and every one of theſe hath this common nature, eſſence, or being, from Art; that it is ſuch a frame. For therefore it is ſuch a frame, becauſe it is an art.

Examp.

Expoſit.

The generall is either Soveraigne, or Supreame, Subiect, or Inferiour. 5

The Speciall is either Middlemoſt, or Loweſt. 6

The Supreame genus is that, which hath no genus aboue it.

So in Logicall Invention, an Argument, is the Supreame generall, of arguments artificiall, and Inartificiall: For there is none aboue it.

The

The Inferiour generall, and so the speciall, is that, which is inferiour to one, and superiour to another.

Exposit. As in *Logicke*, an artificiall argument is inferiour to an argument; but superiour to Primitiue, and Derivatiue arguments. Therefore an Argument (as I said before) is the supreame or most generall; Artificiall is inferiour to it, but superiour to every one, that followes in that ranke; and so is every one of them, to as many as come after them, in the same ranke; so that, all but an argument, are inferiour generalls, or middle specialls; for those two are all one; called specialls, in respect of the generalls aboue thē; generalls, in regard of the specialls vnder them.

The lowest speciall is that, which cannot be diuided into other specialls. Such are the matter, and the form of this or that particuler;

Exposit. As of this man, of that Lyon, or the like. The body of a man, or Lyon, may be distributed into divers parts;

parts; but they are members of an integrall, not ſpecialls of a generall.

The generalls, and the ſpecialls, are badges of the cauſes, and effects: as in a living creature, there is a corporeall, or bodily ſubſtance, which is the matter, belonging ioyntly to man and beaſt.

For each of theſe is a bodily ſubſtance.

There is beſides, a facultie of life, and ſenſe; which is a forme that pertaineth æqually to the ſpecialls, Man and beaſt. For each of theſe hath life and ſenſe.

Therefore the generalls containe the cauſes, which belong ioyntly and æqually to their ſpecialls; and contrariwiſe, their ſpecialls containe the effects of their generalls.

Hereupon the generall is famous & excellent; as that, which declareth the cauſe. For it ſheweth the cauſe of the ſpecialls; which is ſhut vp in the generalls, and given by them to the ſpecialls. Expoſit.

The distribution of the generall into the specialls, is indeede very excellent, but [a] *hardly and seldome to be found out.*

Expos. [a] *Hardly*] Because the formes of the specialls, are not easily knowne; and we haue no terme to expresse the generalls, and specialls.

Yet for [a] *illustration and example sake, we will set downe, what we can.*

Expos. [a] *Illustration*] To make the matter cleare and plaine.

Examp. *Living creatures are diuided by the* Poët *into six kinds,* Angels, Feinds, Men, Beasts, Fowles, Fishes.

In heauen, the blessed Angels haue their being;
In hell, the Feinds appointed to damnation:
To Men, & beasts, earth yeelds firm habitation;
The wing'd Musicians in the ayre are fleing.
With finnes the people gliding,
Of water haue the enioyning. Dav: Ode: 9.

It is all one, whether we diuide the generall into the specials, or into the formes of the specialls; because

the

the formes and generalls together, make the ſpecialls.

So that, if you adde the formes of the ſpecialls, to the generals, you haue the whole nature of them. For example; *Of liuing creatures, ſome[a] ſpeak, ſome are dumbe.* Expoſit.

[a] *Speake*] This is not a diſtribution by the formes, but by the proper adjuncts, following neceſſarily from the formes; and therfore is put in ſtead of a diſtribution by the forme. Perhaps wee may put this for an example; of Arts, one teacheth to ſpeake well; another to reaſon well; a third to number well; a fourth to meaſure well. Art is the generall; Grammar, Logick, Arithmeticke, Geometry, the ſpecialls; in ſtead whereof wee put ſpeaking well, reaſoning well, numbring well, meaſuring well, which are their formes. Expoſit.

Sometime the generall and ſpecials, are otherwiſe handled; ſo that the one is concluded from the other.

So Tully in his Oration for Archias the Examp.

Poët, cõcludeth from the generall, which is Art, that Oratory and Poëtry, are as it were of a kind.

Ovid contrariwiſe, argues the generall by the ſpecialls.

In this diſtreſſe, let vertue be thy ſtay:
Where danger ſtops, there glory makes her way.
While Troy had peace, braue Hector was not knowne;
In publike troubles, vertues force is ſhowne.
If Seas be calme, what neede we Typhis skill?
What's Phœbus art, when men are healthfull ſtill?
While fortune ſmiles, braue vertue hidden lies:
But when ſhee frownes, it ſhines in all mens eyes.

Ovid. Triſt. 4.

Expoſit. Here the *Poët* proveth the generall, that, Adverſitie ſheweth true vertue; by three ſpecialls: *Hectors* valour was made knowne in his Countryes danger; *Typhis* ſhewed his skill in ſtormes; *Phœbus* giues proofe of his art in ſickneſſe.

Therefore ſpeciall examples, applyed to their generall, belong to this place.

Examp. *By faith, the Elders were well reported of &c. By faith, Abell offered &c.*

By

By faith, Enoch was taken away, &c. Heb. 11. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. &c.

Chap. XXVII.

Of Distribution into the Subjects.

There remaineth to be handled the distribution of arguments, which are consentany after a sort; as subiects, and adiuncts: Distribution by the subiects is, when the parts are subiects. 1

Thou shalt not make the likenesse of any thing, that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water that is vnder the earth. Exod. 20. 4. *Examp.*

Creatures are divided by their subject places, wherein they abide, Heaven, Earth, Water. *Exposit.*

The Cities of Refuge, in the land of Israell, are divided according to the subiect place; three on this side Iordan, three beyond. *Examp.*

Having therefore gifts differing, accor-

ding to the grace that is given to vs; whether Prophecy, let vs prophecy according to the proportion of faith; or Miniſtery, let vs wait on our Miniſtery; or he that teacheth, on teaching; or he that exhorteth, in exhortation; he that giveth, let him doe it with ſimplicitie; he that ruleth, with diligence; he that ſheweth mercy, with chearfulnes. Rom. 12. 6. 7. 8.

Expoſit. The gifts are diſtributed according to the objects; wherein they are employed; prophecy, miniſtery, teaching, exhorting, giving, ruling, ſhewing mercy.

Chap. XXVIII.

Of diſtribution by the adjuncts.

1 *Diſtribution by the Adiuncts is, when the parts are Adiuncts.*

Examp. *Of men, ſome are whole, ſome are ſicke; ſome rich, ſome poore.*

To one is given by the Spirit the word of wiſdome; to another the word of knowledge; to another faith; to another the gifts of healing; to another working of Miracles;

Miracles; to another Prophecy; to another discerning of spirits; to another divers kindes of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues. 1 Cor. 12. 8. 9. 10.

Here the faithfull are divided, according to the gifts bestowed, which are adjuncts. Exposit.

The Amalekites dwell in the land of the South; and the Hittites, and the Iebusites, & the Amorites dwell in the mountaines, and the Canaanites dwell by the Sea, and by the coasts of Iordan. Num. 13. 20.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of a Definition.

A Definition is, when we declare what a thing is. The declaration of the nature of a thing, is the definition thereof. 1

The definition may be argued by the thing defined; as the thing is argued by it. 2

A definition is perfect, or imper- 3

fect. That is properly called a definition; this a description.

4 A perfect definition, is a definition that consists onely of those causes, which constitute or make the essence of the thing; that is, of the matter and forme.

According hereto, Man is defined, A reasonable living creature. By the generall, living creature (as was said) we vnderstand a bodily substance, full of life and sense, which is the matter of a man, and part of the forme: to which if you adde reasonable, you shall haue the whole forme of a man, in the facultie of life, sense, and reason.

Therefore a perfect definition is nothing else, but a generall marke, or badge of the causes, which make the essence, or the nature of the thing.

Such are the definitions of Arts.

Exam. Grammar is an art of speaking well.

Rhe-

Rhetorick is an art of pleading well. Logick of reasoning well; Arithmetick of numbring well; Geometry of measuring well.

Chap. XXX.

Of Description.

Description is a definition, which describeth, or sets out, a thing, even by other arguments. Though the matter and forme be not knowne, or set downe. 1

As a man is a living creature, mortall, capable of learning. In this description of a man, two adjuncts (the one proper) are mingled, with some cause of his being; namely, the generall matter, *living creature.* Examp.

But this brevitie, or shortnes, is not alwayes used, in this kind of defining; but oftentimes wee have a more famous and goodly declaration. 2

I saw a woman sit upon a skarlet coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy, having Examp.

ving ſeaven heads, and ten hornes: and the woman was arayed in purple, and skarlet, and girded with gold and precious ſtones, and pearles, and had a cup of gold in her hand full of abominations, and filthineſſe of her fornications; and in her forehead a name written; A myſterie, Great Babylon, the mother of whoredomes, and abominations of the earth; And I ſaw the woman drunken with the blood of Saints, and with the blood of the Martyrs of Ieſus. Revel. 17. 4. 5. 6.

Salomons ſong is full of theſe deſcriptions: eſpecially Chap. 5. verſ. 10. to the end. And Chap. 6. from verſ. 3. to the 10.

There grew an aged tree on the greene,
A goodly Oak ſometime had it beene;
With armes full ſtrong & largely diſplay'd,
But of their leaues they were diſarraid.
The body bigge and mightily pight;
Through'y rooted, and of wondrous height.
Whilome had beene King of the field,
And Mychell maſt to the husband did yeeld.
And with his nuts larded many a ſwine,
But now the gray moſſe had marr'd his rine.

His

His bared boughs were beaten with stormes;
His top was bald, and wasted with wormes:
His honour decayed, his branches sere.
Shepheards Kalend. Febr.

Such are the descriptions of plants, and living creatures in naturall Philosophy; also of rivers, mountaines, and cities, in Geographie.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of a Divine Testimony.

Having declared an artificiall argument, I come now to an Inartificiall argument. 1

An Inartificiall argument is that, which argueth not, of [a] *its owne nature, but by strength taken from some* [b] *artificiall argument.* 2

Expos.

[a] *Its owne nature*] Artificiall arguments argue, or declare a thing, of their owne nature; The primitiue haue force to argue, both in, and of themselues. The derivatiue in themselues, but not of themselues. The inar-

artificiall haue no ſtrength at all to argue, either of, or in themſelues.

[b] *Some artificiall*] Namely, from the efficient cauſe, or author of it; vpon whoſe credit, all the ſtrength of an inartificiall argument dependeth.

3 *Therefore, when the* [a] *exact truth of a thing is narrowly ſought after, it hath very little force, to proue any thing.*

Expoſit. [a] *Exact*] The exact or perfect truth is narrowly ſought for, when we deſire to know *διότι*, the reaſon how a thing commeth to be ſo; and in this inquiry no teſtimony can giue ſatisfaction. For it doth no more but ſay, It is ſo. The diuine teſtimony is ſufficient to breed certainty, yea moſt ſufficient: but it is euidence, and cleerenes we ſeek for in the ſearch of truth; that we may ſee, how, and why it is ſo.

4 *But in ciuill and humane affaires, this argument, for the moſt part, hath ſpeciall force to perſwade, from the qualities of him that is witneſſe:*

witnesse: if he be wise, vertuous, and a friend.

It is called in one word a testimony. 5

If it be with an oath, it is in Law tearmed a *Deposition*; I thinke of laying a mans hands on the booke, when he sweareth. Expos.

A testimony is Divine or humane. 6

Among Divine testimonies, the Heathen reckon not onely the Oracles of their Gods; but also the answers of their Prophets and Soothsayers. So do the *Papists* the *Decrees* of generall *Councels*, and of the Pope in his Consistory. 7

I will take examples from the Oracles of the onely true God.

Of the tree of the knowledge of good & evill, thou shalt not eat. For the day, that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die. Gen. 2. 17. Examp.

I will put enmitie betwixt thee and the woman, betwixt thy seede and her seede. It shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heele. Gen. 3. 15.

This

This is my beloved Sonne, in whom I am well pleased. Mat. 3. 17.

Whosoever beleeveth, and is baptized, shall be saved. Mark. 16. 16.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of an humane testimony.

1 *An humane, or mans testimony, is common, or proper.*

2 *Common, as a Law written or unwritten; and a famous sentence.*

Examp. *I make a Decree, that in every dominion of my kingdome, men tremble, and feare before the God of Daniell; for he is the living God, and remaineth for ever; and his kingdome shall not perish, and his dominion shall be everlasting.* Dan. 6. 26.

I make a Decree, that every people, nation, and language, which speake any blasphemy against the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, shall be drawne in peeces, and their houses shall be made dunghils; because there is no God, that can deliver after this sort. Dan. 3. vers. 29.

Famous

3 Exemp.

Famous sentences are Proverbs.

Let not him that girdeth on his sword, boast himselfe, as he that putteth it off. 1 King. 20. 11.

Physician heale thy selfe. Luk. 4. 23.

The sayings of wisemen, which are also proper.

A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches. Prov. 22. 1.

Testimonies of living men, are not onely, when there is quæstion of land, slaughter, debt, trespasse, and such like; but also obligations, confessions, and oaths, are testimonies.

A pledge or pawne, is a kind of obligation.

A confession is either free, or forced by torture.

Hitherto also may that argument be referred, when we proue that we say by experience.

Swearing also is a testimony.

Here the arguing from the testimony to the witnesse, is not clearely and evidently true; that, Because the

the

the teſtimony is true, therefore the witnes alſo is a ſpeaker of truth.

A ſpeaker of] He is *verax*, a ſpeaker of truth, who by an inward habit, vertue, or qualitie, is inclin'd and fitted to ſpeak the truth alwayes. A man may, vpō occaſion, for hope of good, or feare of hurt, ſpeake truth, and yet be no ſpeaker of truth. This onely followes vpon a true teſtimony, that he, which delivereth it, is in that particular, a true witneſſe.

THE

THE SECOND BOOKE of RAMVS Logicke.

CHAP. I.

What Iudgement is.

Hitherto we haue handled the first part of Logick, *called* Invention, *we come now to the second, termed Iudgement.* 1

[a] *Iudgement is a* [b] *part of Logicke, touching the* [c] *disposing of arguments, that we may Iudge* [d] *well.* 2

[a] *Iudgement*] By Iudgement, wee meane the doctrine, that teacheth vs to dispose, or joyne Arguments together; whereas Invention sheweth onely the nature of them severally. [b] *Part*] Such a part, as the soule and body are of man; which giue being to it; For (as I haue often sayd) Logicke is nothing but Expos.

Invention & Iudgement. [c] *Disposing*] That sheweth vs, how Arguments are to be coupled, and set in order, each with other. [d] *Well*] As indeede wee ought to Iudge, according to truth; this is the end of disposing, or joyning arguments together.

3 *For* [a] *every thing is to be iudged according to certaine* [b] *rules of disposition.*

Exposit. [a] *Every thing*] No true judgement can be given of any thing according to *Logicke*, vnlesse arguments be so disposed as art requires. [b] *Rules of*] If we would judge of truth and falshood; we must joyne the arguments together, according to the rules of an Axiome or proposition. If we would know; what followeth vpon this or that, what doth not; wee are to set downe our propositions after the rules of a Syllogisme. Would we vnderstand, whether things be orderly handled, or no? Let vs haue recourse to the precepts concerning Method.

[a] *Hereof*,

4 [a] *Hereof, this part of Logicke is called both Iudgement and Diſpoſition; the ſame thing being ſignified by both.*

Expoſit. [a] *Hereof*] Becauſe the end is judging, and the meanes to judge is diſpoſing: therefore this part hath both theſe names.

Chap. II.

Of the affirming or denying of an Axiome.

1 [a] *Iudgement is* [b] *Axiomaticall, or Dianoëticall.*

1 [a] *Iudgement*] The rules, whereby we are taught to diſpoſe Arguments, & ſo to judge of them. [b] *Axiomaticall*] Ἀξίωμα in Greeke ſignifieth properly, authoritie, dignitie: with *Logicians* it is taken either for ſuch a propoſition, or ſentence, as is commonly knowne to be true; or generally for any propoſitiõ whatſoever; in which ſenſe, *Tully*, *Ramus*, and many other vſe it.

These rules are either concerning an *Axiome*; which onely setteth downe the arguments joyned together; or *Dianoëticall*, which discourseth of them, some way or other; as shall appeare when wee come to that part.

All disposing of arguments is either without discourse, or with it; without it; when seing the arguments set downe in a proposition, wee either yeeld to it as true, or refuse it as false, or quæstion it as doubtfull; of truth and falshood apparant, a proposition judgeth sufficiently; when doubt ariseth, we are faine to come to discourse. Other way of judging there is none; Therefore all judgement is *Axiomaticall*, or *Dianoëticall*.

2 *An Axiome is the* [a] *disposing of* [b] *one argument with another, wherby we iudge, that a thing* [c] *is, or is not.*

[a] *Disposing*] It is called disposition, or disposing, rather then judgement; because this floweth out of that; we judge by disposing.

[b] *One*

[b] *One argument*] For the parts of an *Axiom* are arguments; and here appeareth the vſe of Invention, which ſheweth vs the nature of arguments. For if we know not the nature of the ſeverall arguments, how ſhall we be able to judge, whether they be rightly diſpoſed or no, and ſo, whether the *Axioms* be true or no?

[c] *Is, or is not*] Severall arguments cauſe no judgement at all, as, ſnow, white; but if we joyne them together, and ſay, ſnow is white, it is judged, that ſomthing is; if we ſay ſnow is not white, judgement is given, that ſomething is not.

Is, and is not, are largely to be taken, for all action, paſſion, all times, &c. as, *Ioab* kild *Abner*; where the act, and the time paſt is noted. *The Sonne of man muſt ſuffer many things*; where the paſſion, and time to come is ſignified. Neither doe theſe words onely note being, or not being; but farther teach vs, that ſomething is this, or that; as ſnow is white, giues vs to vnderſtand, that whiteneſſe is ſayd to belong to ſnow.

3

An *Axiom* is called in English, a propoſition, a ſentence, a ſpeech.

Ramus ſayth nothing of the parts of a propoſition; becauſe it is manifeſt, that the two arguments, make the two parts of it. The former is named by *Ramus* the Antecedent part, of *antecedere*, to goe before; the other conſequent of *conſequi*, to follow.

Ariſtotle calles the one the Leading tearme, the other the following.

Some name the former the 1. Leſſe terme, or extreame. 2. The ſubject. Leſſe; becauſe it is argued by the other; the ſubject, becauſe it is the object, or thing, to which the other is joyned, or which is declared; terme, or extreame; becauſe it is, as it were, one bound of the propoſition; namely, in the forepart.

The latter is called the 1. Greater terme, or extreame; becauſe the other is declared, or made knowne by it: 2. the Prædicate; as you would ſay, that which is proclaimed, or publiſhed of the former. 3. The attribute, that which is attributed, given, put,

added

added, to the other to declare it.

That, which joynes theſe two arguments together, is called by *Ramus* the Bond, or Band; by other *Logicians* the Couple.

An Axiome is [a] *Affirmed, or* [b] *Denyed.* 4

[a] Affirmation by ſome is termed Compoſition, becauſe it joyneth the parts together.

[b] Negation is called Diviſion; becauſe it divides the parts aſunder.

Affirmed, when the [a] *band of it is affirmed; Denyed, when it is denyed.* 5

[a] *Band*] When the conſequent is tyed to the antecedent by the band, it is affirm'd; when it is ſevered from it, by denying the bond, it is denied.

From [a] *hence ariſeth the* [b] *contradiction of Axioms; when the ſame axiom is affirmed and denyed.* 6

[a] *From hence*] From the affirming, or denying the bond, or Couple.

[b] *Contradiction*] Gainſaying, of *con-*

tradicere, to say against, or contrary to that which was said.

Chap. III.

Of a true and false Axiome.

1 *Secondly, an Axiome, or proposition, is True, or False.*

2 *True, when it saith,* [a] *as the thing is. False, contrary.* When it saith otherwise, then the thing is.

[a] *As the thing is*] Truth is the æqualitie, or agreement betwixt the thing, and the vnderstanding; if wee conceiue the thing, as indeede it is; wee conceiue the truth, or truly, & rightly of it. From which conceit of ours, speech followeth, and is true, or false accordingly.

3 *A true Axiome is Contingent, or Necessary.*

4 [a] *Contingent, when it is in such sort true, that it may also at some time be false.*

[a] *Contingent*] The word is commonly

ly vſed for that which happeneth, and is not ſuch as it is, by any neceſſitie of nature.

Philoſophers, & eſpecially Schoole-Divines, call all truth *Contingent*, which hath not abſolute neceſſitie of being; therefore all truth concerning created things, is with them *Contingent*; becauſe it might haue pleaſed God, that thoſe things ſhould haue beene otherwiſe. That which concerneth God in himſelfe, is abſolutely neceſſary. For it could by no meanes haue beene otherwiſe.

——*Fortune ſends aid to the ventrous.*

Admit this be true to day, to morrow, or another time it may be falſe.

Therefore the iudgement of ſuch contingent truth, is termed opinion; which may be certainly known to a man, in reſpect of things paſt, and preſent; But the nature of things to come, will afford no ſuch certaintie; although [a] *all times are preſent in reſpect of God.*

[a] *All times*] Man cannot certainly know

know what is to come, vnleſſe God reveale it to him, as he hath done many things in the Scriptures; But God can; the reaſon whereof *Ramus* thinketh (as the Schoolemen out of *Boetius* commonly hold) is, that, All times are preſent to GOD, and ſo all things in thoſe times certainly knowne, as being in his ſight.

6 *A neceſſary Axiome is, when it is alwayes true, and cannot be falſe*; as God is immortall. *Such an Axiom if it be affirmed, is called* Καθ' παντός, *of* [a] *all*, or the whole.

[a] *Of all*] When the conſequent, or latter part of the propoſition is truly affirmed of all, or the whole antecedent, or former part.

7 *An Axiom neceſſarily falſe, is called an Impoßible Axiom.* Which cannot poſſibly be true at any time. *As God is mortall.*

8 *Rules or* [a] *Precepts of Arts, ought to be in this ſort generall.*

[a] *Precepts*] Becauſe *Logick* inſtructs and

and fits vs for the learning of all arts. *Ramus* thought it needfull to deliver rules to that purpose. Now where should they be taught, but in the generall doctrine of an *Axiom*, before we come to the specials: since in some arts, namely, Mathematicks, we must set downe, as well compound, as simple *Axioms*, which are the species or sorts of an *Axiom*.

This rule requires, that every precept of an art be true; because wee looke for the true knowledge of the art in the severall Precepts. Therfore also must they be necessarily true; that they may breede judgement in vs, not opinion; which is vncertaine.

Lastly; it is necessary they should be affirm'd. For precepts which are denying *Axioms*, may perhaps shew vs how to avoyd some errour, but cannot make vs know the truth.

They must also be Homogeny, and Catholike. 9

An [a] Homogeny axiom is, when one of 10

of the parts is [b] *essentiall to the other; as the forme to the thing formed; the subiect to the proper adiunct; the generall to the speciall: This is called* Καθ' αὑτὸ *of it selfe; when the cõsequent part belongeth to the antecedent, of it selfe or essentially.*

[a] *Homogeny*] ὁμοῦ γένους, of the same kinde. [b] *Essentiall*] Giue essence, or being; as in the examples; the forme makes the thing formed to be that it is. The proper adjunct floweth from the forme naturally. The generall giues being to the specialls. Rules of art must be thus essentiall, or els they cannot teach vs true knowledge, which consisteth in knowing the essence of things.

11 *A* [a] *Catholike Axiom is, when the consequent is* [b] *alwayes true of the antecedent; not only of the* [c] *whole, and of it* [d] *selfe, but also* [e] *interchangeably.* Καθ' ὅλου πρῶτον. *First* [f] *of the whole.*

[a] *Catholike*]

[a] *Catholike*] Is as much as vniuerſall; καθ' ὅλου, according to the whole.
[b] *Alwayes*] Therefore it muſt be neceſſarily true; ſo that it cannot at any time be falſe: this is the firſt thing in this *Axiome*. [c] *Of the whole*] Of euery part of the whole; ſo that there is nothing cõceiued by the antecedent, to which the conſequent doth not agree: this is the ſecond. [d] *Of it ſelfe*] The conſequent muſt be true of the antecedent naturally, and properly, not by occaſion or accident: ſo is the forme of the thing formed; ſo the proper adjunct of the ſubiect. [e] *Interchangeably*] So that the whole antecedent is in like ſort true of the conſequent; and will argue it, as it is argued by it: as in the examples.

Examp.

A man is a liuing creature indued with reaſon. Euery liuing creature indued with reaſon is a man. Here is the forme arguing the thing formed, and the thing formed arguing the forme.

Number is euen or odd: whatſoeuer is euen or odd is number. Here we haue the proper adjunct, *euen, or odd*; affirmed

firmed of the ſubject; the number; and the ſubject contrariwiſe of the proper adjunct.

A Wolfe doth naturally howle; whatſoever doth naturally howle is a Wolfe. Here alſo is the proper adjunct coupled with the ſubject to declare it; and in like ſort the ſubject with the proper adjunct. [f] *Firſt of the whole*] That is vniverſally firſt.

12 *Theſe are the three lawes that muſt be kept in framing rules of Art; The firſt is called the law of truth,* becauſe it requires, that the *Axiom* be neceſſarily true, in the agreemẽt of the parts, antecedent, and conſequent.

The ſecond is named the Law of Iuſtice; becauſe it will haue every one haue his due, and not abide, that thoſe things be coupled together, which agree not by their very eſſence, or nature.

The third is termed the Law of Wiſdome; becauſe precepts or rules thus fram'd, breed true and certaine knowledge.

And

And the [a] *iudgement of* [b] *such true and Catholike axioms, is the* [c] *first and most true knowledge.* 13

[a] *The iudgement*] That is bred in vs by the vnderstanding, and beleeving such manner of *Axioms*. [b] *Such true*] *Axioms* in such manner true and Catholike. [c] *First*] Either because it is the knowledge of principles, vpon which all the other dependeth; or perhaps (as *Aristotle* speaketh) proper: For many times he calleth that which is proper, first.

Chap. IIII.

Of a simple Axiom.

And thus much of the [a] *common affections of an axiom: the* [b] *kinds of axioms follow.* 1

[a] *Common affections*] Affections are, as it were properties; how then are they common? As laughing & speaking are proper to mankind; but common to every singular man, one

one and other. [b] *Kinds*] The diverſe kinds and ſorts of *Axioms* are next to be handled: the affections or properties of affirming and denying of truth and falſhood, doe not make diverſe kinds of propoſitions; but note certaine things belonging to all kinds; ſo that every kind is either affirmed, or denyed, true or falſe.

2 *An axiom is ſimple or Compound.*

A ſimple axiom is that, the [a] *band whereof is a* [b] *Verbe.*

[a] *Band.*] This band is as it were the forme of an *Axiom*; therefore as the band differeth, ſo doth the thing it ſelfe. Therefore there is good reaſon to make divers kinds of *Axioms*, according to the diverſitie of the band, or couple. [b] *A verbe.*] That word in Grammar or ſpeech is a Verbe, which ſignifieth doing, ſuffering, or being. *He that loveth me keepeth my commandements*: there are two verbs in this ſentence, *loveth*, and *keepeth*; both which note ſome action or doing. *The Lord Ieſus was crucified.* Here the verbe

verbe is, *was crucified*; For wee haue not one word, as the *Hebrewes*, *Graecians*, and *Romanes* haue, to expreſſe the verb paſſiue, or ſuffering. *Ieſus Chriſt is God.* The verbe here is the word *Is*, which noteth being.

In every *Axiom* there is one verbe or other, as ſhall be ſhewed.

3 *Therefore the axiom is affirmed or denyed, as the verbe is: as Fire burneth. This axiom is affirmed, or affirmatiue, becauſe the verbe burneth, the band of it, is affirmed.* Burneth is a verbe actiue, noting doing. *Fire is hot. The verbe Is, is affirmed. Therefore the axiom is affirmed; becauſe the band is.*

Fire is not water. This *Axiom* is denyed or negatiue, becauſe the band *Is* being the verbe, is denyed.

In theſe *Axioms*, fire is the antecedent, or former part of the *Axiom*; burneth the conſequent, including or conteining the verb, or band in it. In the ſecond, the conſequent is, *hot*: in the third, *water*.

4 *Here haue we the first kind of disposing or ioyning arguments made knowne to vs by Invention: as in the first example, Fire burneth; The cause with the effect. In the second. Fire is hot: The subiect with the adiunct. In the third, Fire is not water; two dissentanies, Aduersatiues one with another.*

5 *And* [a] *thus may any argument (except* [b] *full comparisons and distributions) be set downe, in a proposition;* [c] *Consentanies affirmatiuely, Dissentanies negatiuely.*

[a] *Thus*] In a simple *Axiom*, making the verbe the band. [b] *Full comparisons*] For such comparisons and distributions, must needs haue a conjunction to couple them together. [c] *Consentanies affirmatiuely*] Consentany arguments must be joyned together by way of affirmation, or affirming; dissentany by way of negation, or denying. This of consentany ar-

arguments, is to be thus vnderstood; if you argue a consentany argument by a consentany, you must affirme the one by the other; as *Paul* writ diverse Epistles; but if you will deny the effect of the cause, or shew that this effect belongeth not to that cause, you must deny the one of the other; as *Paul* writ not divers Epistles. *Paul* and *writing Epistles* are cause & effect; in the one I affirme the effect of the cause, and so they are properly consentany; in the other, I deny the same effect of the same cause, and so make a contradiction. Therefore the same arguments remaine; els how should it be the same *Axiom*? And if the *Axioms* be diverse, there can be no contradiction.

A simple axiom is generall or speciall. 6

Generall, when the common consequent is [a] *generally attributed to the common antecedent.* 7

[a] *Generally attributed*] Attributed, prædicated; either affirmed or denyed;

ed; To be generally attributed, is to be so attributed, that nothing is contained vnder the signification of the antecedent, or subject, to which the consequent or prædicate may not truly be applyed. As, *Man is a reasonable creature.* This is a generall *Axiom*, because there is nothing contained vnder the terme *Man*, which is the subject of this proposition, to which the attribute *Reasonable creature* doth not belong.

8 *And here contradiction doth not alwayes divide truth from falshood; but both parts may be false in a contingent proposition.*

No Church in London is fairer then Mary Wool Church.

Each Church in Londō is fairer then Mary-Wool-Church.

Both these propositions are false; For there are some Churches fairer, some not so faire.

9 *Yea in axioms not contingent also, sometime both parts of the contradiction are false:* as,

Every

Every living creature is reasonable.
No living creature is reasonable.
Both false.

A speciall axiom is particular or proper. 10

Particular, when the common consequent is particularly attributed to the antecedent: And this axiom must be contradicted by a generall: as,

1. *Some sinnes are pardonible.*
No sinnes are pardonable.
2. *Some clemency is not praise-worthy*
All clemency is prayse-worthy.

A proper axiom is when the [a] *consequent is attributed to a* [b] *proper antecedent:* as, 11

Paul is an Apostle.
Paul is not an Apostle. the contradiction is

[a] *Consequent*] Whether it be generall or speciall.

[b] *Proper*] That is, singular, or individuall, as it is called; which cannot be divided into lower species, or specialls.

Chap. V.

Of a Copulatiue Axiom.

1 *A Compound axiom is that, the band whereof is a Coniunction.*

The parts whereof are coupled together by a conjunction. A conjunction is a word that joyneth the parts of ſpeech together; of *coniungere*, to joyne together. This is generally called an Hypotheticall propoſition; though indeed hypothetical, is one ſpeciall kind of a compound *Axiom*.

2 *Therefore by the affirming, or denying of the coniunction, the axiom it ſelfe is affirmed or denyed.* For the band is the forme of an *axiom*: as hath beene ſaid.

3 *And one part of the contradiction is true, the other falſe.*

One of the propoſitions, that gainſay each other, is true, the other falſe.

4 *A Compound axiom is* [a] *congregatiue, or ſegregatiue; according as the coniunction is.*

[a] *Con-*

[a] *Congregatiue*] Of *congregare*, to gather the flocke together, comes Congregatiue: this sheweth, that the diverse parts in the proposition belong to the same thing.

A Congregatiue axiom disposeth consentany arguments, by [a] *way of affirmation, dissentany by way of negation.* 5

[a] *By way of*] When there be diverse consentany arguments in a proposition, if the one be affirmed of the subject, so must the other be also: and contrariwise; if one be denyed, so must the other be also: If there be diverse dissentanies, the one must be denyed, the rest affirmed; or contrariwise.

And it (a congregatiue *axiom*) 6
is either { *Copulatiue.* / *Connexiue.*

Copulatiue, the coniunction whereof is Copulatiue. 7

Copulare, to couple: *copula*, a couple for doggs: When the band or couple

is a conjunction, that knits the parts of ſpeech together, then the *Axiom* is copulative; as,

The Lord Ieſus was delivered to death for our ſinnes, and raiſed againe for our iuſtification. Here are two conſentany arguments, namely, adjuncts: *delivered to death, raiſed againe*; the former is affirmed of our Saviour; therefore the latter muſt be affirmed too.

It is ſaid of the heavenly *Ieruſalem*, Revel. 22. 15. *Without ſhall be dogs, and ſorcerers, and murtherers, & whoremongers, and idolaters, and whoſoever loveth, and maketh a lye.* The contradiction is; *Without ſhall not be dogs, and ſorcerers, and murtherers, &c.*

8 *To make a copulative axiom true, it is required, that all the parts thereof be true: to make it falſe, it is enough, that ſome one of the parts be falſe.*

As, if either doggs, or ſorcerers, or murtherers, or whoremongers, or idolaters, or lyers be not without, then the whole propoſition is falſe, which ſayth, they are all without. *Neere*

Neere of kind to this is an axiom, wherin there is a [a] *relation of qualitie or quantitie; and in ſuch propoſitions, the* [b] *relation it ſelfe is the coniunction.* 9

[a] *Relation of qualitie*] Thoſe propoſitions, wherein comparatiue arguments are ſet downe at large, ſo that the one part hath reference of qualitie or quantitie to the other, are to be referred to the Copulatiue *Axioms*.

[b] *Relation it ſelfe*] Theſe propoſitions are coupled together by the relation that is betwixt them; which is in ſtead of a conjunction.

As a bird, that wandreth from her neſt: ſo is a man, that wandreth from his place. Prov. 27. 8.

Here we iudge of truth & falſhood, as if it were a copulatiue axiom: in this ſort.

A bird that wandreth from her neſt is in danger; and ſo is a man that wandreth from his place.

The negation, and contradiction is, A man that wandreth from his place, is

is not as a bird that wandreth from her neſt.

Chap. VI.

Of a Connexe Axiom.

1 *A [a] Connexe axiom is a [b] Congregatiue axiom, the coniunction wherof is a coniunction [c] connexiue.*

[a] *Connexe*] Of *connectere*, to knit together. [b] *Congregatiue*] Therfore all, that was noted before of a Congregative *axiom*, muſt be vnderſtood alſo of a Connexe. [c] *Connexiue*] Grammarians commonly call theſe conjunctions conditionall; and this is properly an Hypotheticall propoſition.

If in this life onely we haue hope in Chriſt, we are of all men moſt miſerable. 1 Cor. 15. 19.

The contradiction to a Connexe propoſition, is properly by a diſcrete *axiom*: wherein alſo the chiefeſt vſe of that *axiom* conſiſts: Although in this

this life only we haue hope in Christ, yet are we not of all men moſt miſerable.

If I yet pleaſed men, I ſhould not be the ſeruant of God. Gal. 1. 10.

The contradictory is, Though I yet pleaſed men; I ſhould be the ſeruant of God.

2 *This coniunction is ſometime more manifeſtly denyed, by denying the conſequence*; by denying, that the latter followes vpon the former: as *I am not by and by a cut-throat, if I keepe company with cut-throats.* Cic: pro: Sext: Roſc.

It doth not preſently follow, that if every propoſitiõ be true or falſe, then the cauſes of things are vnchangable. *de Fato.*

3 *For the affirmation implyeth, that if the antecedent be the cõſequent alſo is: But the negation and contradiction ſaith, that Although the antecedent be, yet it followes not, that the conſequent therefore is.* Where-

4

Wherefore, when you iudge that a connexe axiom is absolutely, simply, and of it selfe, (or of its nature) *true, you shall iudge also, that it is necessarily true: and you shall understand, that this necessitie ariseth, from the necessary knitting of the parts together; which may be, where the parts are false.*

If a man be a Lyon he is fourefooted, is an *axiom* necessarily true: and yet the parts are false: For it is false, that a man is a Lyon; and it is as false that he is fourfooted: yet if you graunt the former, that he is a Lyon; you must needs also grant, that he is fourfooted: For every Lyon hath foure feete.

But if the connexion be contingent, and be taken onely as probable, the iudgement we attaine to by it, is but opinion onely: as,

If thou speake kind words to them, they will serue thee for ever. 1 King. 12. 17. This was likely, but not certaine.

There

There is a relation of consequence, which is of the same nature with a connexe axiom: as, seeing Tully is an Orator, he can pleade well. 5

Such in a manner are these:

Whereas there are among you envying, and strife, and divisions, are you not carnall? 1 Cor. 3. 3.

The contradictory is. Though we haue these amongst vs: yet are we not carnall.

The Pharisies sayd vnto him. Thou beareſt record of thy selfe, thy record is not true. Ioh. 8. 13.

Here the connexion is not expreſſed; but it is manifest by our Saviours answer, that they so disputed against him, as if they should haue sayd; since thou beareſt record of thy selfe, thy record is not true: For he answers in the next verse; *though I beare record of my selfe; yet my record is true.*

Sometime the conjunction is not expreſſed at all; *yee shall not eate of it, neither shall ye touch it, least yee die. And the Serpent sayd vnto the woman,*

yee

yee ſhall not ſurely die. Gen. 3. 3. 4. The contradiction is, Although yee eate, yet yee ſhall not dye.

CHAP. VII.

Of a Diſcrete Axiom.

1 *A* [a] *Segregatiue axiom is that, the* [b] *coniunction whereof is ſegregatiue.*

[a] SEgregatiue] Of *Segregare*, to part or ſevere the flocke; generally to ſeparate. [b] *Coniunction*] That word is a conjunction *Segregatiue*, which ſevereth or divideth the parts of ſpeech each from other.

2 *In this propoſition the parts are ſevered or divided, as not agreeing. Therefore onely diſſentany arguments are diſpoſed in ſegregatiue axioms.*

3 *A ſegregatiue propoſition is either diſcrete or diſiunct.*

4 [a] *Diſcrete, the coniunction whereof is* [b] *diſcretiue.*

[a] *Diſcrete*]

[a] *Discrete*] Of *discernere*, to sever or separate. Hence discerning in English, when a man sees how one thing differs from another. [b] *Discretiue*] A conjunction Discretiue, severeth the parts of the proposition: yet so, that they are signified to differ but in some sort.

[a] *Therefore among the dissentanies, it consists especially of arguments, that are diverse from each other.* 5

[a] *Therefore*] Because it noteth but a small disagreement.

Though I walke through the vale of the shadow of death, I will feare no evill. Psal. 23. 4. *Examp.*

The contradictory is; If I walke through the vale of the shadow of death, I will feare some evill.

Though I be rude in speech, yet I am not so in knowledge. 2 Cor. 11. 6.

The contradictory is; If I be rude in speech, I am so in knowledge.

A discrete axiom is iudged to be true and good, if the parts be not onely true, but also [a] *diverse.* 6

[a] *Diverse*]

[a] *Diuerſe*] It is not enough to the truth and goodneſſe of a diſcreet axiom, that the parts be true; vnleſſe they be alſo diuerſe each from other: otherwiſe it is falſe and ridiculous: as, *Though Paul were an Apoſtle; yet he was ſent by the Lord Ieſus to Preach the Goſpell.* Here both parts be true; *Paul* was an Apoſtle; *Paul* was ſent by the Lord Ieſus to Preach the Goſpell; and yet the propoſition is ridiculous and abſurd; becauſe the parts are not diuerſe. For to be an Apoſtle, and to be ſent by the Lord Ieſus to Preach the Goſpell, are not diuerſe things, but the ſame.

CHAP. VIII.

Of a Disjunct axiom.

1 *A* [a] *diſiunct axiom is a ſegregatiue propoſition, the coniunction whereof is a Diſiunctiue.*

[a] *Diſiunct*] Of *Diſiungere*, to disjoyne, to vnyoak, to ſeparate. A conjunction disjunctiue wholy divideth one part of ſpeech from another.

The

The Lord ſhall ſmite him, or his day ſhall come to dye, or he ſhall deſcend into battaile and periſh. 1 Sam. 26. 10. Examp.

The contradiction is. Neither ſhall the Lord ſmite him, nor his day come to die, neither ſhall he deſcend into battaile and periſh.

No man can ſerue two Maiſters. For either he will hate the one, and loue the other, or hold to the one, and deſpiſe the other. Mat. 6. 24

The contradiction is. Neither will he hate the one, and loue the other: nor hold to the one, and deſpiſe the other.

By contradiction we ſignifie, that there is no neceſſity, that one of them ſhould be true.

Here it is preſumed, that onely one of the things disjoyned is true. Whether it be ſo or no indeed; he that maketh the disjunction, taketh it for granted that it is ſo.

If the diſioyning, or ſevering, be 2
[a] abſolutely true, it is alſo neceſſarily true, & the parts ſevered are

[b] *opposit without any middle.*

[a] *Absolutely*] Not contingently, but simply; so that they cannot be false.

[b] *Opposit*] Are such opposits, as haue no middle thing betwixt them: therefore they are not disparats, but contraries.

3 *Yet: Although a disiunction absolutely true, be also necessary: it is not necessary, that the parts severally taken be necessary:* as,

A man is good or not good; is a necessary disjunctiō: yet A man is good; is not a necessary *axiom*: Also a man is not good, is not a necessary *axiom*. For these propositions are but contingently true, not necessarily.

4 *But the* [a] *necessitie of the disiunction dependeth vpon the necessary opposition of the parts, not vpon the necessary truth of them.*

[a] *Necessitie of the*] That which maketh the disjunction necessarily true, is, that the parts are necessarily set each against other; whether they be necessarily true or no, if you consider them severally.

Now

Now a disiunction is for the most part vpon a condition: as, 5

If it be demanded, whether the *Iewes* will free the *Lord Iesus*, or *Barrabas*; because the deputie had resolved, they should haue but one of the two.

If therefore the disiunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but onely probable, or likely, *and such disiunctions men ordinarily make:* as 6

Yet though in vaine needs must I speake,
Or els my swelling heart will breake.

Dav: canz: 15.

Neither of these is necessary; though he spake not; yet his heart might not breake.

Chap. IX.

Of a Syllogisme, and the parts thereof.

Thus haue wee declared the iudgement which is Axiomaticall, or by an axiom, to wit, *of an axiom manifest of it selfe. Now followeth* 1

Dianoëticall, or diſcurſiue, the judgement wee attaine to by diſcourſe.

2 *Diſcourſe is, when one Axiom is drawne out of another.*

3 *And it is either a Syllogiſme, or Method.*

4 *A* [a] *ſyllogiſme is a diſcourſe, wherein the* [b] *quæſtiõ is ſo diſpoſed with the argument, that if the antecedent be granted, it muſt* [c] *neceſſarily be concluded.*

[a] *Syllogiſme*] Of Λογίζομαι, to caſt account, or λέγω, to gather together, when by adding, ſubducting, multiplying, or deviding, we find out what the ſumme, the reſt, the number, or the quotient is. [b] *Quæſtion*] This *Ramus* expoundeth in the words following the definition. [c] *Neceſſarily concluded*] The concluſion of every true ſyllogiſme, neceſſarily followeth vpon the antecedent or former part: ſo that if you grant that, you muſt of neceſſitie yeeld the conſequent, or concluſion.

Fur

For when an axiom is [a] doubtfull, it is made a [b] quæstion: for the proofe wherof we haue need of a [c] third argumẽt [d] disposed with the quæstiõ. 5

[a] *Doubtfull*] An *axiom* manifest of it selfe, needeth no other rules to teach vs how to judge of it, then haue alreadie bin delivered: but if it be doubtfull, so that it appeare not plainely, whether it be true or false, it becommeth a quæstion.

[b] *Quæstion*] A matter to be enquired of; *Quærere*, is to enquire, or seeke out. [c] *Third argument*] Wee vnderstand that every proposition hath two arguments, the one in the former part of it, the other in the latter; if it be not manifest, whether these agree or disagree, as in truth they ought to doe, we must haue a third, as it were an vmpire. This is called in other *Logicks*, *Medius terminus*, the middle terme; because the arguments are called termes; or *Medium*, the meane, or middle. [d] *Disposed*] How this must be don, the precepts following shew.

6 *The* [a] *Antecedent*, or former part, *of a ſyllogiſme hath two parts, the* [b] *Propoſition and Aſſumption.*

[a] *Antecedent*] There are two parts of a ſyllogiſme; the former called the antecedent, the latter called the conſequent, or concluſion. The antecedent alſo it ſelfe hath two parts.

[b] *Propoſition*] This word *Propoſition*, is now the third time vſed in *Logicke*. Firſt, it ſignified the former part of a full Compariſon of likeneſſe, which we might haue named the *Reſembler*; becauſe it reſembleth the thing it declareth. Secondly, it is put for an *axiom*; and in this ſenſe it is well known almoſt to every ordinary man: and therefore I thinke it may not conueniently be altered. Thirdly, in this place it ſignifieth the firſt propoſitiõ in a ſyllogiſme; and it is reaſonable well knowne by that name, neither haue I any ſo fit to put in the place of it.

7 *The propoſition is the firſt part of the antecedent, wherein* [a] *at the leaſt,*

leaſt, the [b] *conſequent part of the quæſtion is placed with the argument.*

[a] *At the leaſt*] Becauſe in componnd ſyllogiſmes, not onely the conſequent, but the whole quæſtion, is ſet downe in the propoſition. [b] *Conſequent*] The Prædicate, or attribute, which followeth the band or couple, muſt in every ſyllogiſme be placed in ſome part of the propoſition.

This is termd the *Maior* or greater propoſition; becauſe the aſſumption is taken out of it. It is cõmonly called the *Maior*; without adding propoſition.

The Aſſumption is the ſecond part of the antecedent, [a] *which is* [b] *taken out of the propoſition.* §

[a] *Which is*] It may ſeeme, that as the conſequent of the quæſtion was diſpoſed in the propoſition, with the third arguments; ſo the antecedent ſhould be in the aſſumption. But many times, in a connexe ſyllogiſme, there is nothing in the aſſumption,

but the third argument; as, If the Father be a Lord, the ſonne is a ſlaue: But the Father is a Lord; which is the third argument. [b] *Is taken*] In a compound ſyllogiſme, ſometime onely the third argument (as I noted) is taken out of the propoſition, and maketh the whole aſſumption: now becauſe that is the principall thing for proofe, it is ſayd, that the aſſumption is taken, becauſe that is taken.

But indeed this manner of diſcourſe is onely in a ſimple ſyllogiſme. The propoſition, which is as it were the foundation of the whole frame, is for the moſt part ſome generall rule of one Art or other; and therefore conteineth the argument, but in a generall manner; the aſſumption takes it out of the Propoſition, and applyeth it neerer to the poynt in quæſtion.

9 *The Conſequent*, or latter part, *of the ſyllogiſme, is that which* [a] *comprizeth the parts of the queſtion, and* [b] *concludeth it: whence it is called*

led the [c]*Complexion and Concluſion.*

[a]*Comprizeth*] In the propoſition and aſſumption, for the moſt part (alwaies in a ſimple ſyllogiſme) there is but one part of the quæſtiō, *viz.* the ſubject or prædicate, the concluſion evermore hath them both. [b]*Concludeth it*] Of *Concludere*, of *Claudo*, to ſhut vp: this taketh the whole quæſtion, and ſhuts it vp, for as much as concerneth that ſyllogiſme. [c]*Complexion*] Of *complecto*, to embrace, or compriſe, is *Complexion*, which compriſeth and concludeth the quæſtion.

If [a]*any part of a ſyllogiſme be wanting, it is called an* [b]*Enthymeme.* 10

[a]*Any part*] It falleth out commonly, that in the writings of learned men, either the propoſition, or the aſſumption, or the concluſion, or ſome one or two of them is not ſet downe.

[b]*Enthymeme*] It is a Greeke word, and hath nothing in it, whereby the nature of the thing is ſignified. For it is nothing but an vnperfect ſyllogiſme.

If

11 *If there be any* [a] *other part beſides theſe three, it is called a* [b] *Proſyllogiſme.*

[a] *Other part*] Sometimes, yea very often, good Authors adde to the propoſition or aſſumption, ſomewhat, which may ſerue to the proofe of that to which it is added. [b] *Proſyllogiſme*] I can giue no ſufficient reaſon of this name; vnleſſe I ſay it ſignifieth as much as For a ſyllogiſme; as if this proofe were in ſtead of a ſyllogiſme, to make the *Axiom* good.

12 *Alſo the order of the parts is often confounded:* the parts being placed otherwiſe, then they ſhould be; as the aſſumption or concluſion firſt, the propoſition laſt.

13 *If any doubt ariſe hereupon, the things* or axioms *that are wanting muſt be ſupplyed; thoſe that are ſuperfluous, muſt be cut of; and every part is to be ſet in his due place.*

Chap. X.

Of a Contract simple syllogisme.

A syllogisme is simple, or compoũd. 1

These are the severall kinds of *Syllogismes.*

Simple, where the Consequent part of the question is placed in the proposition, the antecedent in the assumption: This is called *Categoricall.* 2

And it is affirmatiue, when all the parts are affirmatiue. Negatiue, when either part of the antecedent is Negatiue, and the Conclusion. 3

In an affirmatiue syllogisme, all parts, proposition, assumption, and conclusiō must be affirmed: It is enough to make a negatiue syllogisme, that either proposition or assumption be denyed, and the conclusion, though the other part be affirmed.

A syllogisme is generall, when the proposition, and assumption are generall. Speciall, when either of them 4

them is ſpeciall. [a]*Proper, when both are proper.*

[a] *Proper*] Proper is here taken Grammatically, when there is ſome proper name; other *Logicians* call it *Singular*, which is the loweſt, or moſt ſpeciall *Species*, according to *Ramus*; to other *Individuum*, that cannot be divided into any inferiour *Species*, or into any, that are more ſpeciall.

5 *A ſimple ſyllogiſme hath the parts contracted or explicated.*

6 *A* [a] *contract ſyllogiſme is, when the argument, brought as an* [b] *example, is ſo applyed to the* [c] *particular queſtion, that it is the* [d] *antecedent in both parts, and the aſſumption* [e] *affirmed.*

[a] *Contract*] Of *contrahere*, to draw together; it is ſo called, becauſe the parts of the ſyllogiſme are as it were cruſht vp together. [b] *Example*] There are foure things required to a contract ſyllogiſme: the firſt, that the argument be brought by way of example.

ample. [c] The ſecond thing is, that the queſtion be a particular *Axiom*. [d] *Antecedent*.] The third is, that the argument be the ſubject or former part, both in the propoſition, and aſſumption. For ſo we conceiue vpon the hearing. [e] *Affirmed*] The laſt is, that the aſſumption be affirmed.

Some confidence is a vertue; as conſtancy.
Some confidence is not a vertue; as audacioufnes. Exam.

Here the quæſtion is particular; *ſome confidence is a vertue*: the argument is brought by way of example, *as conſtancy*: which is all one, as if we ſhould ſay, for example, *conſtancy*. Vpon the hearing or thought of this propoſition, we ſtreight way conceiue, that *conſtancy*, which is the argument, *is a vertue*: and that the ſame *conſtancy* is *confidence*; as if it were ſayd in expreſſe termes; that *conſtancy* is a *vertue*, and that it is *confidence*; and in this manner of our conceiving, we make the argument *conſtancy*, the antecedent in the propoſition, and aſſumption. So in the negatiue example. Laſtly, the aſſumption is affirmed.

Thus

7 *Thus* [a] *vſe*, practiſe, *in reaſoning, which is the rule of ſyllogiſticall iudgement*, or judging by a ſyllogiſme, *hath* [b] *contracted this ſyllogiſme; not otherwiſe vnfolded* or ſtretched it out.

[a] *Vſe*] The practiſe of learned men, that reaſon well, is one of the breeders of *Logicke*; and therefore is to be followed in teaching *Logicke*. [b] *Contracted*] This is, if not the onely, yet the ordinary courſe of diſputing by this kind of ſyllogiſme; perhaps ſome examples may be found, where it is expreſt at large, in the ſeverall parts: as yet, I thinke, none haue beene.

8 *And this* [a] *expoſition is made by Ariſtotle the* [b] *beginning of a ſyllogiſme, the parts whereof are expreſſed; as if it were of it ſelfe* [c] *more cleare and famous; then iudgment by a full ſyllogiſme.*

[a] *Expoſition*] *Ariſtotle* calleth this kind of reaſoning by applying, a ſpe-

ciall

ciall example to the concluding of a particular quæſtion, ἔκθεσιν, *expoſitionem*; to this *Ramus* hath reference, when he calleth this ſyllogiſme, *expoſition*. [b] *Beginning*] Becauſe this (as I ſhewed in the expounding of it) hath as it were an whole ſyllogiſme in it, eaſily to be diſcerned. [c] *More cleare*] Becauſe it ſheweth vs all at once, at one view, and requireth not any farther enlarging. This is the third figure in *Ariſtotle*. Now figure in *Ariſtotle* ſignifies the diſpoſing of the middle terme with the parts of the queſtion; which may be done three wayes, as we ſee in *Ramus*. The third figure is, when the argument is made the ſubject, or antecedent in both parts; as in a *contract* ſyllogiſme. Some Interpreters of *Ariſtotle*, haue deviſed certaine words, as they call them; to ſhew how many wayes we may conclude in theſe figures, which they ſignifie by ſeverall words; wherein *A* notes a generall affirmatiue propoſition: *E* a generall negatiue: *I* a particular affirmatiue: *O* a particu-

particular negatiue. In this third figure, there are six Moods, or severall wayes of concluding; as these six words signifie.

DARAPTI, FELAPTON, DISAMIS, DATISI, BOCARDO, FERISON.

Affirmatiue generall.

DA- *All constancy is a vertue.*
RAP- *All constancy is confidence.*
TI. *Therefore some confidence is a vertue.*

Negatiue generall.

FE- *No audaciousnesse is a vertue.*
LAP *All audaciousnesse is confidence.*
TON. *Therefore some confidence is not a vertue.*

Affirmatiue speciall.

DI- *Some Christians liue wickedly.*
SA- *All Christians are professors of Religion.*
MIS. *Therefore some professors of Religion do liue wickedly.*

Affirmatiue speciall.

DA- *All beleevers shall be saved.*
TI- *Some beleevers doubt of their salvation.*
SI. *Therefore some that doubt of their salvation, shall be saved.*

Negatiue speciall.

BO- *Some righteous men are not learned.*
CAR- *All righteous men shall be saved.*
DO. *Therefore some that shall be saved, are not learned.*

Negatiue

Negatiue ſpeciall.

FE- *No wicked livers ſhall be ſaved.*
RI- *Some wicked livers are baptized.*
SON. *Therefore ſome that are baptized, ſhall not be ſaved.*

CHAP. XI.

Of the firſt kind of a ſimple explicate Syllogiſme.

In an [a] explicate ſyllogiſme, the propoſition is [b] alwayes generall, or proper, and the concluſion like the [c] antecedent, or [d] weaker part. 1

[a] *Explicate*] *Plicare* is to fold; *explicare* to vnfold: of this, a ſyllogiſme, which is ſpread abroad, the parts of it being layd out to ſight, is called *explicate*. [b] *Alwayes*] Namely, where the ſyllogiſme conſiſts of ſimple propoſitions. [c] *Antecedent*] The propoſition and aſſumption: namely, like them, in affirming, or denying; in generalitie, or ſpecialitie; if they be affirmatiue, ſo is the concluſion; if

negatiue, that is negatiue; if they be generall, that is generall; if they be ſpeciall, that is ſo; it is altogether like them, if they be both of the ſame kind. [d] *Weaker part*] If either propoſition or aſſumption be particular, or negatiue, the concluſion is ſo alſo. For the ſpeciall is weaker then the generall, becauſe it is but a part of it; the negatiue weaker then the affirmatiue, becauſe it is a denying of being.

2 *There are two kinds of it. The firſt is, where the argument* [a] *alwayes follows, being* [b] *denyed in one of the parts.*

[a] *Alwayes*] Both in propoſition and aſſumption. [b] *Denyed*] Either in the propoſition, or aſſumption; ſo that one of the parts of the antecedent muſt be negatiue.

This is *Ariſtotles* ſecond figure: the Moods of it are theſe:

CESARE, CAMESTRES, FESTINO, BAROCO.

Generall 1.

CE

CE- *No man overcome with passion can vse reason well.*

SA- *Every wise man can vse reason well.*

RE. *Therefore no wise man is overcome with passion.*

This is thus concluded by *Cicero. Tusc. quæst. 3. A mind disquieted with passion, is not well fitted to doe its dutie. Now the dutie of the mind is to vse reason; and the mind of a wise man is alwayes so fitted, that he can vse reason well; therefore he is never disquieted with passion.*

Generall 2.

CA- *He that can grieue for sinne, as it is offensiue to God, must apprehend God as reconciled and loving to him.*

MES- *No man, but he that hath faith, can apprehend God as reconciled and loving to him.*

TRES. *Therefore no man but he that hath faith, can grieue for sinne, as it is offensiue to God.*

No man can apprehend God as reconciled and loving to him, till he haue faith; therefore none can grieue for sinne, as it

is offensiue to God, till he first haue faith. Helpe to happines. part. 3. quæst. 4.

The proposition is here wanting, the other two parts are set downe in expresse words.

Speciall 1.

FE- *None that had knowne the wisdome of God, would haue crucified the Lord of glory.*

STI- *But the Princes of the world haue crucified the Lord of glory.*

NO. *Therefore the Princes of the world, knew not the wisedome of God.*

Wee speake the wisedome of God in a mystery; which none of the Princes of the world knew; for had they knowne it, they would not haue crucified the Lord of glory. 1 Cor. 2. 7. 8.

Speciall 2.

BA- *Whosoever is of God, heareth Gods word.*

RO- *But yee heare not Gods word.*

CO. *Therefore yee are not of God.*

He that is of God, heareth Gods words; yee therfore heare them not, because yee are not of God. Ioh. 8. 47. Here

Here the propoſition is fully expreſſed. The concluſion of our Lords diſputation is manifeſt by the Text, that the *Iewes* who refuſed him for the *Meſſias*, were not of God, but of their father the Devill, *verſ.* 38 41. 44.

The aſſumption alſo is evident by the Text; wherein he findeth fault with them, for not hearing the words of God of him. The aſſumption and concluſion are put together; and the concluſion made the cauſe of the aſſumption; that they might bethinke themſelues whence this his obedience came.

Proper 1.

Peter was not the Diſciple whom Ieſus loved.

Iohn was the Diſciple that Ieſus loved.

Therefore Iohn was not Peter.

Proper 2.

Iudas, that writ the Epiſtle, was the brother of Iames.

Iudas Iſcariot was not the brother of Iames.

Therefore Iudas Iſcariot was not he that writ the Epiſtle.

Chap. XII.

Of the second kind of a simple explicate syllogisme.

1 *The second kind of an explicate syllogisme, is when the argument goeth before,* or is the subject, or antecedent, *in the proposition; and followeth affirmed in the assumptiõ,* or is the prædicate or consequent.

This is *Aristotles* first figure: which hath these foure Moods:

BARBARA, CELARENT, DARII, FERIO.

Affirm: Gen:

BAR *Whosoever is borne of God, overcommeth the world.*

BA- *Every one that beleeveth, that Iesus Christ is the son of God, is borne of God.*

R A. *Therefore every one that beleeveth, that Iesus Christ is the Sonne of God, overcommeth the world.*

1 Ioh. 5. 1. *Whosoever beleeveth that Iesus is the Christ, is borne of God.* ver. 1.

Whatsoever is borne of God, overcometh the world, and this is the victory that overcommeth the world, even our faith, ver. 4. *Who is he that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth that Iesus is the Sonne of God?* ver. 5.

Negat: Gen:

CE- *No murtherer hath eternall life abiding in him.*

LA- *Every one, that hateth his brother, is a murtherer.*

RENT. *Therefore none that hateth his brother, hath æternall life abiding in him.*

He that hateth his brother, abideth in death. Whosoever hateth his brother is a murtherer; and ye know that no murtherer hath æternall life abiding in him. 1 Ioh. 3. 14. 15.

By this kind of reason, our Saviour cleares himselfe of Blasphemy.

Whom the Father hath sanctified, & sent into the world, he blaspheweth not, because he saith, I am the Sonne of God.

But Iesus Christ is he, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world.

Therefore he blaſpheweth not in ſaying, he is the Son of God. Ioh. 10. 36.

Ioh. 10. 36. *Say yee of him whom the Father hath ſanctified, and ſent into the world, Thou blaſphemeſt, becauſe I ſayd I am the Sonne of God?*

Affirm: ſpec:

D A- *Whomſoever God heareth, is of God, and no ſinner.*

R I- *But the Lord Ieſus Chriſt God heareth.*

I. *Therfore the Lord Ieſus Chriſt is of God, and no ſinner.*

Now we know, that God heareth not ſinners; but if any man be a worſhipper of him, and doth his will, him he heareth. If this man were not of God, he could doe nothing. Ioh. 9. 31. 33.

Negat: ſpec:

F E- *None that are borne only according to the fleſh, are the promiſed ſeede.*

R I- *But ſome of Abrahams children are borne only according to the fleſh.*

O. *Therefore ſome of Abrahams children, are not the promiſed ſeede.*

They

They are not all Israel, which are of Israel; Neither because they are the seede of Abraham, are they all children; but in Isaac shall thy seede be called; That is, they which are the children of the flesh, are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the seede. Rom. 9. 6, 7. 8.

Affirm: Proper.

The Sonne of God, and the virgin Mary, is the Messiah.

Iesus Christ is the Son of God, and the virgin Mary.

Therefore Iesus Christ is the Messiah.

Negat: Proper.

Andrew was not brought vp at the feete of Gamaliell.

Thou art Andrew.

Therefore thou wert not brought vp at the feete of Gamaliel.

To this place also belong those syllogismes, which consist of three connexe *Axioms*: as,

If there be no resurrection from the dead, then is our faith vaine:

But if Christ be not risen againe, there

is

is no reſurrection of the dead.

Therefore if Chriſt be not riſen againe, our faith is vaine.

Now that this is a ſimple ſyllogiſme, and of this kind, it may appeare, by the diſpoſitiō of the third argument, which is the antecedent in the propoſition, and conſequent in the aſſumption.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the firſt connexe Syllogiſme.

1 *Hitherto of a ſimple ſyllogiſme. A compound ſyllogiſme is a ſyllogiſme, where the* [a] *whole quæſtion is one part of the propoſition, being* [b] *affirmatiue and compound, the argument the* [c] *other part.*

This is an Hypotheticall ſyllogiſme.

[a] *The whole quæſtion*] Not onely the conſequent part thereof; as in a ſimple ſyllogiſme.

[b] *Affirmatiue*] The propoſition of a compound ſyllogiſme, muſt be compound, and affirmatiue.

[c] *Other*

[c] *Other part*] The propoſition conſiſteth of the whole quæſtion, and the argument.

To [a] *take away in a compound ſyllogiſme, is to make a ſpeciall contradiction.* 2

[a] *Take away*] It is vſed in compound ſyllogiſmes, and ſignifies as much, as gainſaying, that which you take away by a ſpeciall contradiction.

A Compound ſyllogiſme is connexe, or diſiunct. 3

A connexe is a compoũd ſyllogiſme, the propoſition whereof is connexe. And it is of two ſorts. 4

The firſt ſort of a connex ſyllogiſme, is that, which aſſumeth the antecedent, & cõcludeth the conſequent. 5

The former part or ſubject is the aſſumption; the latter part or prædicate the concluſion.

If God ſpared not the naturall branches, he will not ſpare thoſe that are not naturall. Rom. 11. 21. *Examp.*

But God ſpared not the naturall branches, verſ. 19. *There-*

Therefore will he not ſpare thoſe, that are not naturall. verſ. 20. 21.

Thou wilt ſay then, The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in. Be not high minded, but feare. *For if God ſpared not the naturall branches, take heed leaſt he alſo ſpare not thee.* Rom. 11. 19. 20 21.

If ye being evill know how to give good gifts to your children, much more ſhall your father which is in heaven, give good things to them that aske him.

But yee being evill know how to give good gifts to your children.

Therefore God ſhall much more give good gifts to them that aske him.

So our Saviour Chriſt diſputes *Math.* 7. verſ. 11. the prop: verſ. 11. 10. aſſump. verſ. 7. 8. concluſion.

Of this kind is that ſyllogiſme, though not eaſily to be gathered, wherein our Lords diſputation is grounded. *Ioh.* 9. 41.

If yee were blind, you ſhould have no ſinne; but now you ſay, we ſee, therefore your ſinne remaineth.

The diſputation lyeth thus:

If

If yee wittingly refuse me the Messiah, yee are guiltie of grievous sinne.

But yee wittingly refuse me the Messiah.

Therefore yee are guiltie of grievous sinne.

In stead of the proposition, we haue the proofe of it. *If yee refused me unwittingly, you should not sinne grievously; Therefore if yee refuse me wittingly, yee sinne grievously.* For the assumption also wee haue the proofe of it; namely, their owne confessing, or rather boasting of their knowledge; *yee say we see*; their refusing of our Saviour for the *Messiah*, is shewed through the whole Chapter, from vers. 13. to 34.

Here oftentimes we assume not the same thing, but somewhat, that is greater. 6

As *Cicero* in *Catilin* 1. *If thy parents hated thee, and stood in feare of thee, so that thou couldest by no meanes satisfie them, I suppose thou wouldest convey thy selfe some whither out of their sight: Now*

Now thy Countrey (which is the common Mother of vs all) *hateth and feareth thee; and hath beene a good while perswaded, that thou thinkest of nothing, but her destruction. Wilt thou neither reverence her authoritie? Nor follow her advise? Nor feare her power?*

The Syllogisme is thus framed:

If thy parents hated thee, thou oughtest to get thee out of their sight.

The assumption should be; *Thy parents hate thee*: in stead whereof we haue that which is greater; *thy Countrey, the common mother of vs all, hateth thee; Therefore thou oughtest to get thee out of her sight.*

Of this kind is that, *Numb.* 12. 14. *And the Lord sayd to Moses, if her father had spit in her face, should shee not haue beene ashamed seven dayes? Let her be shut out of the host seven dayes.*

The Syllogisme lies thus:

If her father had spit in her face, shee must haue beene sequestred from company seven dayes.

But now God, that is the common father of vs all, hath smitten her with le-

prosie;

proſe; which is more then her fathers ſpitting in her face. Therefore ſhee muſt be ſhut out of the hoſt ſeven dayes.

Perhaps in theſe, and the like ſyllogiſmes, the proofe of the propoſition is put in ſtead of the propoſition it ſelfe; Thus,

If thy Countrey hate and feare thee, thou oughteſt to avoyd her preſence. For if thy parents hated and feared thee, thou oughteſt to haue done ſo; and our Country is the common mother of vs all. If God haue ſtricken her with leproſie, ſhee ought to be ſhut out ſeaven dayes; For if her father had but ſpit in her face, ſhee muſt ſo haue beene ſhut out; and God the father of vs all, hath done more then ſpit in her face.

There is the ſame manner of concluding, when the propoſition implyeth relation of time.

When Paris faire Oenone leaues,
Let Xanthus ſtreames runne to their ſourſe.
Now Paris her of loue bereaues.
Goe ſtreames runne backe againſt your courſe.

As if *Oenone* thus concluded:

If

If Paris forsake Oenone, Xanthus streames shall run backe to their fountaine or spring.

But Paris forsaketh Oenone.

Therefore Xanthus streames shall run backe to their fountaine or spring.

CHAP. XIIII.

Of the second connexe Syllogisme.

1 *The second sort of a connexe Syllogisme, taketh away the consequent, that it may take away the antecedent.*

If the inheritance be of the Law, it is not of promise.

But it is of promise.

Therefore it is not of the Law.

If the inheritance be of the Law, it is no more of promise. But God gaue it Abraham by promise. Gal. 3. 18.

If there had beene a Law given, that could haue given life, verily righteousnesse should not haue beene by the Law.

But

But righteousnesse is not by the Law. Therfore there was not a Law given that could giue life.

If there had beene a Law given, that could haue given life, verily righteousnesse should haue beene by the Law. But the Scripture hath concluded all vnder sinne. Gal. 3. 21. 22.

Here in stead of the assumption, we haue the proofe of it; That the Law shuts vp all vnder sinne; so far is it from making righteous. That which maketh all men sinners, maketh them not righteous. The conclusion in this, and the former Syllogisme is left out; so in the next.

If I regard iniquitie in my heart, God would not heare me.

But God hath heard me.

Therefore I regard not iniquitie in my heart.

If I regard iniquitie in my heart, the Lord will not heare me. But verily God hath heard me, he hath attended to the voyce of my prayer. Psal. 66. 18. 19.

Here also there is a conclusion vpon relation of time.

When Paris leaues to loue Oenone faire;
Let Xanthus ſtreams back to their ſprings repaire.
But Xanthus ſtreames ſhall never back repaire:
Nor Paris leaue to loue Oenone faire.

Paris concludeth thus:
If Paris forſake Oenone, Xanthus ſtreames ſhall runne backward.
But Xanthus ſtreames ſhall never runne backward.
Therefore Paris ſhall never forſake Oenone.

2 *Theſe two kinds of Syllogiſmes, are the moſt vſuall of all.*

Chap. XV.

Of the firſt Diſjunct Syllogiſme.

1 *A diſiunct ſyllogiſme is a compound ſyllogiſme, the propoſition whereof is diſiunct* or a diſjunct axiom.

2 *There are two ſorts. The firſt doth take away the* a *one, and conclude the other.*

a *The one*] For how many ſoeuer the parts of the diſjunction be, they

they are taken for two onely in this caſe: as,

Shall ſeven yeares of famine come vnto thee in thy land? Or wilt thou flee three moneths before thine enemies, while they purſue thee? Or ſhall there be three dayes peſtilence in thy Land? And David ſaid, I am in a great ſtraight. Let vs fall now into the hands of the Lord. 2 Sam. 24. 13.

Either I muſt haue ſeven yeares famine, or be three moneths purſued by mine enemies, or haue three dayes peſtilence.

But I will not haue ſeven yeares famine, nor three moneths flight.

Therefore I will haue three dayes peſtilence.

Chap. XVI.

Of the ſecond diſjunct Syllogiſme.

The ſecond diſiunct, out of the propoſition affirmatiue, [a] *in all the parts,* [b] *aſſumeth one, and* [c] *taketh away the reſt.*

1

[a] *In*

[a] *In all the parts*] All the parts of the proposition must be affirmed, none denyed. [b] *assumeth*] In the assumption you must set downe one of the parts; whether you will, the former, or the latter.

[c] *Takes away*] In the conclusion you must gainsay, or contradict the rest; Therefore the conclusion is always negative.

This onely would I learne of you, Received yee the spirit by the workes of the Law, or by the hearing of faith? Are ye so foolish? Having begun in the spirit, are yee made perfect by the flesh? Gal. 3. 2. 3.

Yee received the spirit either by the workes of the Law, or by the hearing of faith; that is, by the one of them only, not by both. vers. 2.

But yee received it by the hearing of faith. vers. 3.

Therefore not by the workes of the Law.

2 *Such a syllogisme is made of a copulative proposition negative, and it hath*

hath the force of an affirmative disiunction: as,

It is not both day and night; *that is, it is either day or night.*
But it is day.
Therefore it is not night.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Method; which according to *Aristotle*, is one onely.

1 METhod *is a discourse of diverse Axioms of the same kind, placed according to their manifestnesse in nature; whence the agreement of them, one with another is iudged of, and committed to memory.*

2 *And as in an Axiom wee looke after truth, and falshood; in a Syllogisme after consequence, and inconsequence; so we are to have a care in Method, that that, which is most plaine, be first set downe, and that, which is more obscure, follow: and thereby indeed order, and confusion is iudged of.*

So among Axioms of the same kind, that shall be set downe in the first place, which is first absolutely most cleare; that in the second, which is second; that in the third, which is third; and so forward. Therefore Method doth alwayes goe from the generalls to the particulars.

For by this onely way we goe on from things going before, which are altogether, and absolutely easie to be knowne, to the declaring of those things, which follow and are more vnknowne: and this onely Method did Aristotle *teach.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the first illustration of Method by the examples of Arts.

1 *But the examples of Sciences, and Arts doe chiefly declare, and chiefly challenge this one Method.*

In which though all the rules are generall, and vniversall, yet the degrees of them are distinguished: and how much the more generall any one shall be, so much the forwarder it shall be placed.

The

The moſt generall ſhall be firſt in place and order; becauſe it is firſt in light, and knowledge.

The middlemoſt ſhall follow; becauſe they are next in clearenes; and of thoſe, they that are moſt known by nature ſhall be ſet firſt, the leſſe knowne ſhall be ſet after.

And at the laſt the moſt ſpeciall ſhall haue their place.

Therefore the definition, which is moſt generall, ſhall be firſt. The diſtribution ſhall follow.

Which if it be manifold, the partition of it into integrall parts ſhall be firſt, then ſhall follow the diviſion of it into the ſeverall kinds.

And the very parts and kinds againe are to be handled, and defined after the ſame order, that they were diſtributed. And if the explication of them be any thing long, they are to be tyed together by bands of tranſition: for this doth refreſh and cheare the Auditour.

And that the thing may be the more familiarly conceived, we muſt vſe a familiar example. Let all the definitions, di-

ſtributions, and rules of Grammar be found out; and every one ſeverally indged of; and let all theſe inſtructions be written in ſeverall peices, and let them be ſhaked and toſſed up and downe altogether in a pot, as we vſe to doe in a Lottery: here if you would ſeeke what part of Logick ſhould teach you to diſpoſe, and ſet in order theſe rules ſo confuſedly mingled together: firſt, there is no neede of the places of Invention, ſeing all are already found out: neither of the firſt indgement of an Axiom, ſeing every Axiom is proved and allowed: neither is there any need of the ſecond indgment, by a ſyllogiſme, ſeing all controverſies about every particular thing haue beene diſcuſſed, and concluded: onely Method remaineth. A Logician therefore, by the ſight of artificiall Method, will gather out of this pot, the definition of Grammar (for that is the moſt generall) and ſet it in the firſt place: Grammar is an Art of ſpeaking well. Then he will looke in the ſame pot for a partition of Grammar, and ſet it in the ſecond place: There are two parts of Grammar, Etymologie

and

and Syntaxe. Thirdly, he will gather out of the same pot, the definition of Etymologie concerning words, and will ioyne it to that which went before in the third place. Fourthly, he will looke out the definition of a word; letters and syllables; and the kindes of it, words with number; and without number; and will set transitions at the ends, in their due places. And so he will set in order the definitions of all the parts of Etymologie, the distributions, joynings of one to another, last of all, the most speciall examples in every particular. And the same will he doe in Syntaxis. This course have all Arts appointed for themselues.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the second illustration of Method, by the examples of *Poë's*, *Orateurs*, and *Historiographers*.

BVt Method is not onely vsed in the master of Arts and Sciences, but in all

all things, which wee will easily and clearely teach.

Therefore Poëts and Oratours, and generally all Writers, as often as they take vpon them, to teach their auditour, will follow this course, though they doe not altogether keepe themselues to it.

Examp. Examples of this we haue in euery Sermon; and in euery booke, that is orderly written. So *Chaucer* in *Troïlus* diuides his *Poëm* into two parts: his change from griefe to joy, and then againe from joy to griefe: the former in the three former bookes: the latter in the two latter.

The double sorrow of Troïlus to tellen,
That was King Priamus *sonne of Troy;*
In louing how his aduentures fellen,
From woe to weale and after out of Ioy;
My purpose is, ere that I part from yee.

It is my purpose before I leaue you, to tell the double aduentures of *Troïlus* in his loue.

In the third Booke he comes to the other part.

——*How*

— How Creſide Troïlus forſooke;
Or at the leaſt, how that ſhe was vnkind;
Muſt hence-forth be the matter of my
(Booke.

In the Bookes following, I muſt ſhew how *Creſide* forſooke *Troïlus.*

Oratours affect this order, in their Præface, Narration, Confirmation, and Peroration, and they call it the order of Art, of nature, and of the thing it ſelfe: and ſometime they doe very diligently follow it.

Chap. XX.

Of the hiding of *Method.*

THIS therefore ſhall be the Method in diverſe Axioms of the ſame kind, which are knowne either by their owne, or ſyllogiſticall iudgement, as often as any thing is clearely to be taught. 3

But when we will after any ſort deceiue our Auditour with delight, or any ſtronger motion, ſome homogeneall axi- 2

oms

ones shall be cast away, as the lights of definitions, partitions, and transitions; some heterogeneall axioms shall be used, as digression from the matter, and long stayings on it; but especially the order of things in the beginning shall be changed: and some things that should goe before, shall be set after them, that should follow.

Therefore in comparison of that rule of perfect Method, this forme some-where imperfect, is not onely lame, by reason of some things that are left out, or abounding with superfluous things, but also prapesterous in order, by reason that certaine parts of the matter are misplaced.

Which the Poët doth with a kind of the greater shew of Art, when he purposeth to lead or perswade the people, which is a beast with many heads: he therefore deceiveth them many wayes: he beginneth with the middle, and therein oftentimes comprehendeth the beginning; last of all, he concludes with some uncertaine and unlooked-for event. So doth *Heliodorus* in his *Æthiopian History* of *Theagenes*, & *Cariclæa*. So Sir *Philip Sidney* in his *Arcadia*.

So

So comicall Poëts, though they distinguish their Comedies into Acts and Scenes, with great iudgement; yet they make all things seeme to happen by chance.

The Orators referre all to victory; that they may overcome those, against whom they pleade. Therefore (not so much to instruct as to mone) that which is strongest, is alwayes placed first by them; yet so that those things, which are as excellent, are kept for the last place, and those that are but so so, are thrust into the middle of the Trompe and Battayle.

(*.*)

FINIS.